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RETHINKING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT FOR THE
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT: DO REIMBURSEMENT
STATUTES SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT TO
COUNSEL OF CHOICE FOR THE INDIGENT?"
Wayne D. Hollyt
The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values which it
advances depends upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of
official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process.'
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."2 In
Gideon v. Wainwright, this Sixth Amendment right was extended to
state criminal defendants through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? Within certain limitations, primarily de-
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1 1963 A'"Y GEN. ANN. REP. 10-11. (Report of Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Unless otherwise noted, the "right to counsel" referred to
throughout this Article is that right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as opposed to
the nonconstitutional Miranda right associated with the Fifth Amendment. See Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The Sixth Amendment was
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signed to preserve judicial integrity and efficiency,4 criminal defen-
dants with sufficient resources have a constitutionally protected
right to retain counsel of their own choosing.' The right of an ac-
cused to retain counsel of his choice "reflects constitutional protec-
tion of the defendant's free choice independent of concern for the
objective fairness of the proceeding."' That right of choice, howev-
er, does not extend to the indigent. Indeed, the familiar adage that
"beggars can't be choosers" has uniformly been incorporated into
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, it has been regularly held
that while an indigent accused is assured an attorney, he is not
entitled to the attorney whom he prefers This rule may superficial-
held to require counsel in all federal criminal proceedings twenty-five years before
Gideon was decided. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Criminal Justice
Act of 1964 provides that an indigent charged with a federal crime may obtain represen-
tation from a court-appointed attorney. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 44(a) (providing that indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel from
initial appearance through first appeal).
4 See infra Part 11.8.
See infra Part II.
6 Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984).
7 Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1997) (r[A]n indigent criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent him."); United
States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although [the petitioner] disputes
the point vigorously, an indigent defendant who seeks court-appointed representation has
no constitutional right to counsel of his choice . . . . '), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1003
(1997); Green v. Abrams, 984 F.2d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "indigent defen-
dant has no right to choose the particular counsel appointed . . . . "); United States v.
Bradley, 892 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1990) (indigent defendants "cannot pick and
choose among members of the district court's bar . . . "); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4, at 546-47 (2d ed. 1996) ("Courts generally hold
that the initial selection of counsel to represent an indigent is a matter resting within
the sound discretion of the trial court . . . . The indigent has no right to counsel of his
choice . . . . "). See infra Part Ill. Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1984), each United States district court, with the approval of the
circuit's judicial counsel, has implemented a plan for furnishing indigent criminal defen-
dants with counsel. Each of the 91 district plans thus adopted uniformly includes a pro-
vision making selection and appointment of counsel the exclusive province of the district
court. Davis v. Stevens, 326 F. Supp. 1182, 1183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that each
of the federal district plans includes a provision stating that a defendant shall not select
his own attorney). See, e.g., D.C. CT. R. ANN. tit. IV (1996) (enacted pursuant to the
D.C. Criminal Justice Act of 1974) (defendant shall not have the right to select appoint-
ed counsel from the panel of attomeys or otherwise); United States v. Bissell, 954 F.
Supp. 903, 920-21 (D.N.J. 1997) (describing similar provision in plan adopted by the
District of New Jersey); United States v. White, 451 F.2d 1225, 1226 (6th Cir. 1971)
(describing provision in plan adopted by the Northem District of Ohio); see also N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991) (making appointment of "Article 18-b" attorneys
on rotational basis without affording defendant's choice in selection of counsel). As is
more fully discussed infra note 118, these local provisions are neither mandated by the
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ly be explained by the notion that defendants receiving legal servic-
es at the expense of the public coffer should not be heard to com-
plain that they were not permitted to select their own counsel.'
However, both federal and state governments rely widely on "reim-
bursement statutes," which enable governments to recover legal
defense costs from indigent defendants as a way to reduce the fiscal
burden of complying with Gideon's mandate.' This reliance war-
rants reconsideration of whether indigent criminal defendants have
a right to counsel of their choice."°
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel. Part II analyzes the dis-
crete corollary right to retain counsel of one's choosing, the consti-
tutional values underlying that right, and the judicially imposed
exceptions which have limited its extent. Part III examines the cur-
rent state of the indigent criminal defendant's "right" to choose his
own counsel and examines the reasons which have traditionally
been cited against recognition of such a "right." Part IV discusses
the wide variety of "recoupment statutes" now in effect under feder-
al and state law and considers the governmental interests sought to
be achieved by such statutes. Part V.A then considers whether the
repayment obligations imposed by recoupment statutes, when con-
sidered in light of the constitutional values underlying the right to
retain counsel of choice, militate in favor of recognizing a limited
right of indigent criminal defendants to select which attorney is
assigned to defend them." After concluding that such a right
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 nor a basis for rejecting an indigent's constitutional claim
of right to some choice in the selection of his attorney.
' See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (hypothecating
and rejecting this argument in slightly different context where defendant attempted to en-
force court's indigent appointment of counsel); cf. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. Unit-
ed States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (stating that a litigant could not defensibly "assert
that impecunious defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel . . .
[lihose who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable com-
plaint so long as they are adequately represented by attomeys appointed by the
courts.').
I See infra Part IV. These statutes have also been described as "recoupment stat-
utes.' This Article uses the terms interchangeably.
,0 This Article does not enter the debate over the advisability or constitutionality of
recoupment statutes but only considers whether their widespread implementation suggests
the appropriateness of reconsidering the infrequently challenged principle that indigent
criminal defendants have no right to counsel of their choice.
" Commentary on this issue is scarce. To my knowledge, the only published law
review devoted to the issue is Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of
His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1974).
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should be recognized, Parts V.B and V.C, respectively, propose a
methodological framework within which to analyze claims based on
the newly recognized right and suggest guidelines for the functional
operation of the proposed framework.
I. THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL
Despite the Sixth Amendment's broad language, the Amend-
ment has been held to guarantee counsel only to those defendants
who are actually imprisoned as a result of a criminal conviction.12
The Amendment, therefore, does not guarantee that an indigent
criminal defendant will not be tried without an attorney. Instead, it
guarantees only that such defendant will not be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the government has afforded appointed
counsel for his defense. 3 Unlike the Miranda right to counsel,"
the Sixth Amendment right does not depend upon a request by the
accused." It attaches automatically at the initiation of adversarial
judicial proceedings, "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information or arraignment."16 The right ap-
plies throughout the trial17 and continues through the preparation
and prosecution of a defendant's first appeal. 8 Following the first
appeal, Sixth Amendment rights come to an end unless and until
the accused is to be retried 9 because there is no federal constitu-
12 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972).
" Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
' See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 469-75 (1966).
"s See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (right to counsel attached to
post-arraignment interrogation).
16 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality).
:7 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger, 407 U.S.
at 25. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (right to counsel applies
at every critical stage of prosecution).
'" Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); see also Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963).
1 The Sixth Amendment states in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
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tional right to counsel during discretionary appeals" or post-con-
viction proceedings,2 including petitions by death row inmates.22
Because an attorney's assistance is among the "raw materials inte-
gral to the building of an effective defense,"23 the right to counsel
is the right to the "effective assistance of counsel;"24 and effective
assistance is guaranteed whether counsel is retained or appoint-
ed.25
II. THE RIGHT TO RETAIN COUNSEL OF CHOICE
A central component of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is the right of the accused to retain counsel of his own choosing.2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20 Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612-16 (1974).
21 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
22 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality). Because there is no con-
stitutional right to counsel during discretionary appeals and post-conviction proceedings,
constitutional claims premised upon the ineffective assistance of counsel during such
review are not cognizable. See Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per
curiam).
1 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
24 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); see also Strictland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
25 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).
26 See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (stating that the
right to counsel of choice "reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free
choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding . . .);
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (stating that 'a defendant must be given a
reasonable opportunity to employ . . . counsel . . . .); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 75 (1942) ('Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel
of his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an accused should be
respected.); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) ('It is hardly necessary to say
that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair oppor-
tunity to secure counsel of his own choice.); United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891,
895 (4th Cir. 1994) ("A defendant's right to have a lawyer of his or her own choosing
is an essential element of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.'); United
States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (Ist Cir. 1986) ("The sixth amendment right to assis-
tance of counsel encompasses a defendant's qualified right to be represented in a crimi-
nal prosection by counsel of his or her own choice.'); United States v. Washington, 797
F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365
(9th Cir. 1984)) ('It is settled law that under the Sixth Amendment criminal defendants
'who can afford to retain counsel have a qualified right to obtain counsel of their
choice."); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1985) ('[O]ur court has long
recognized the accused's right to retain counsel of his choice."); Birt v. Montgomery,
725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that "[when a court unreasonably
denies defendant counsel of choice, the denial can rise to the level of a constitutional
violation."); United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The right to be
represented by counsel of one's choosing has long been regarded as part and parcel of
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Indeed, an unreasonable denial of this right "may so offend our
concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to
a denial of due process."27 The significance of the right adheres in
the remedy for its violation. Thus, it has been held that "[elvidence
of unreasonable or arbitrary interference with an accused's right to
counsel of choice ordinarily mandates reversal without a showing of
prejudice."28 The criminal defendant's personal right to choose his
attorney has unquestionably firm constitutional moorings,29 and its
continued vitality serves compelling systemic and individual inter-
ests.
the 'fundamental' right to be heard through counsel.); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d
52, 55-56 (3d Cir. 1979) ("ITlhe sixth amendment generally protects a defendant's deci-
sion to select a particular attorney to aid him in his efforts to cope with what would
otherwise be an incomprehensible and overpowering governmental authority.'); United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
27 Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70.
28 Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 281. The nearly uniform rule among the Courts of Appeals
which have considered the question is that a defendant who has been denied the right
to counsel of choice need not show prejudice as a condition precedent to appellate
relief. See Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that "harmless error analysis does not apply when a defendant has been denied
the right to substitute counsel"); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1015
(10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1990))
("A conviction attained when a court 'unreasonably or arbitrarily interferes with an ac-
cused['s] right to retain counsel of choice ... cannot stand, irrespective of whether the
defendant has been prejudiced.") (alterations in original); Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d
604, 608 (3d Cir. 1989) ([A] trial court's arbitrary denial of defendant's request for
counsel of choice requires per se reversal."); United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d
813, 818 (1st Cir. 1987) ('A defendant's choice of counsel cannot be reduced to a
mere procedural formality whose deprivation may be allowed absent a showing of preju-
dice. The right to choose one's counsel is an end in itself; its deprivation cannot be
harmless."); Washington, 797 F.2d at 1467 ('[D]enial of a criminal defendant's qualified
right to retain counsel of his choice is reversible error regardless whether prejudice is
shown."); Burton, 584 F.2d at 491 n.19 (stating that "harmless error tests do not apply"
in the right to counsel of choice context); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472
U.S. 424, 443 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds) ('[I]n a criminal case an
erroneous order disqualifying the lawyer chosen by the defendant should result in a
virtually automatic reversal."). But see Tolliver v. Dallman, No. 94-3491, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15398, at *8 (6th Cir. June 16, 1995) (applying harmless error analysis to denial
of request for substitute counsel). The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. See
Koller, 472 U.S. at 438 ("This Court has never held that prejudice is a prerequisite to
reversal of a judgment following erroneous disqualification of counsel in either criminal
or civil cases. As in Flanagan, we need not today decide this question.'); Flanagan, 465
U.S. at 268.
2 See cases cited supra note 26.
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A. Counsel's Role and the Significance of Choice
Our system of criminal justice is premised upon the notion that
"partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free."" ° Indeed, the survival of the adversarial system is dependent
upon counsel's ability to subject the prosecution's case to "mean-
ingful adversarial testing"' without which there can be little confi-
dence in trial outcomes.2 To that end, fulfillment of counsel's role
as an advocate largely depends upon a basic trust between attorney
and client. Because an accused's selection of his attorney pro-
" Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984) (articulating similar role of counsel in criminal justice system);
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that adversarial
testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.').
3 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656.
32 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69, in which Justice Sutherland wrote:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge to adequately prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 ("The purpose of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance neces-
sary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.').
11 This basic trust is the fundamental principal underlying the attomey-client privilege.
See Hadix v. Johnson, 1989 WIL 27984, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 1989) (recogn'izing that
"trust [is] at the heart of the attomey-client privilege'); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207,
212 (6th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that '[b]asic trust between counsel and defendant is the
cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel'); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (commenting that "traditionally the attomey-client privilege has rested on the need
to foster a relationship of trust and free discussion between a lawyer and a private cli-
ent'); see also In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ratel, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) ("[The attorney-
client privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.") (citations
omitted); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Cal. 1973) (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing) ("Effective advocacy involves more than vigor, experience and familiarity with the
law. The attomey-client relationship contemplates trust and mutual cooperation, particu-
larly when the attorney is defending the client's liberty.'); In re Mandell, 69 F.2d 830,
831 (2d Cir. 1934) ("The relationship between attorney and client is highly confidential,
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motes the development of that basic trust,34 which is essential to
counsel's effectiveness," the right to retain counsel of choice
serves the systemic interest of maintaining a healthy adversarial
system.36
In addition to the systemic interest in promoting the adversarial
system of criminal justice, recognition of the right to counsel of
choice also implicates the accused's personal interest in autonomy.
In Sixth Amendment terms, this interest translates into the personal
right to control one's own defense. 7 In this regard, much of the
rationale of Faretta v. California,38 which recognized the Sixth
Amendment right of self-representation, pertains equally to the right
to counsel of choice. Similar to the right of self-representation,
demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmo-
niously."). The Supreme Court's rejection of the notion that the Sixth Amendment en-
compasses the right to a "meaningful attomey-client relationship,' does not diminish the
well-established proposition that an absence of trust between attorney and client dimin-
ishes counsel's ability to act as the effective advocate envisioned by the adversarial
system. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (holding rapport between attorney
and client is not a Sixth Amendment right).
' See United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (Ist Cir. 1987) (quoting
Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1985)) ("The denial of a defendant's
right to choose his own counsel jeopardizes his sixth amendment guarantees because 'a
substantial risk [arises] that the basic trust between counsel and client, which is a cor-
nerstone of the adversary system, would be undercut.") (brackets in original).
" See Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 279 (recognizing that right to select attorney of choice
is "necessary to maintaining a vigorous adversary system . . . ."); United States v.
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981) (recognizing that trust promoted by attomey-client privilege encour-
ages full disclosure which in turn "serves to implement the notion ...that finding the
truth and achieving justice in an adversary system are best served by fully-informed
advocates loyal to their client's interests . . .
36 See Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 279; Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226.
3 See Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 279; United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir.
1982) (recognizing that defendants who sought joint representation by single chosen
attorney through whom they had previously been represented were asserting their "right
to present their defense in what they have reasonably concluded to be the most effec-
tive fashion . . . ."); Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 73 (Cal. 1968) (recognizing
that the value protected by the right to counsel of choice is "'the state's duty to refrain
from unreasonable interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever
manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.'") (citation
omitted); see also cases cited infra note 40.
'8 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (recognizing that "RThe Sixth Amendment does not
provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense.").
19 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 506 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recogniz-
ing that the reasoning of the Faretta decision "is quite relevant" to the analysis of the
right to counsel of choice); Michael E. Lubowitz, Note, The Right to Counsel of Choice
After Wheat v. United States: Whose Choice Is It?, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 437, 464-65
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selection of an attorney is a personal decision which helps deter-
mine the manner in which an accused's defense will be conduct-
ed.4" In fact, this choice has been described as "the most important
decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense."41 Thus,
"[d]ictating who shall act as counsel for the accused, like dictating
that an accused shall be represented by counsel, essentially inter-
poses an organ of the state between an unwilling accused and his
right to choose his defense, and violates the logic of the sixth ame-
ndment."42 The right to retain an attorney personally selected by
the accused thus serves both institutional and individual interests,
the fundamental natures of which are suggested by their inclusion
within the Sixth Amendment.
B. Limitations on Right to Choose
While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is absolute,43 the
right to retain counsel of choice is often not." Even for those with
sufficient resources to retain an attorney of their choosing, their
(1990) (analogizing right to self-representation and right to select attorney of choice); see
also infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. But see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 n.3 (1988) (observing that Faretta 'does not encompass the right to choose
any advocate if the defendant wishes to be represented by counsel.*).
10 See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 1988) ('A
defendant's right to choose an attorney is a corollary of the right to decide what type of
defense the accused will present.'); see also United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56
(3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing that right to select particular attorney is an aspect of Sixth
Amendment "conviction that a defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type
of defense he wishes to mount ... .
" Laura, 607 F.2d at 56.
" Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 279 n.6; see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821 ('An unwanted coun-
sel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Un-
less the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his de-
fense.).
41 See United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1993); Heath v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Chatman, 584
F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Doug-
las, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 ("The Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own
counsel is circumscribed in several important respects.'); Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d
1150, 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing that right to counsel of choice is not absolute);
Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1502 (same); United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816
(1st Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (same);
United States v. Di-ommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.
Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Burton, 584 F.2d at 498
(same); see also infra Parts 11.1.1-3.
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decision may be limited by a number of familiar qualifications de-
signed primarily to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.45
Thus, regardless of ability to pay, a criminal defendant may be
denied representation by an attorney who is unwilling to represent
him;46 by counsel not admitted to the bar of the jurisdiction in
which representation is sought,47 or by a former attorney who has
been disbarred.4" Likewise, a defendant is not entitled to insist on
representation by a lay person.49
In addition to these seemingly well-defined limitations, consis-
tent with the analytical approach to constitutional adjudication in
other areas of the law, courts have employed a "balancing test"5°
to further limit the right to retain counsel of choice in factual cir-
cumstances falling outside of these categorical contexts."1 Typical-
41 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
- Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; see United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 44-45 (Ist
Cir. 1991) (no constitutional violation where defendant's chosen counsel withdrew when
government sought to introduce evidence implicating counsel in the trial where no chal-
lenge made in lower court).
" See Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1503; Williams v. Nix, 751 F.2d 956, 959-60 (8th Cir.
1985); Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Ries,
100 F.3d 1469, 1471 (Ist Cir. 1996) ("A defendant's right to the counsel of his choice
includes the right to have an out-of-state lawyer admitted pro hac vice.") (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Lillie, 989 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1993)).
' See United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1975) (denying request
for representation by disbarred attorney); see also Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1503; United
States v. Afflerbach, 547 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1976).
41 United States v. Tumbull, 888 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1989); Nichols, 841 F.2d
at 1503; United States v. Schmitt, 784 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Wright, 568 F.2d 142, 143 (9th Cir. 1978). A criminal defendant, whether an attorney
or not, has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself, however. See Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
5o See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); see also Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Bal-
ance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1184-1207 (1988) (discussing "balancing" in Fourth Amendment
context).
s' See United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) ('When sixth
amendment rights to counsel come into conflict with the trial judge's discretionary pow-
er to deny continuances, courts apply a balancing of several factors to determine if the
trial judge's action was fair and reasonable."); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485,
489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that when defendant seeks continuance in order to retain
counsel of choice "the 'right to select counsel must be carefully balanced against the
public's interest in the orderly administration of justice . . . ."). The government bears
the burden of proving that the right to retain counsel of choice should be compromised
or denied. See, e.g., Unites States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). The burden has been char-
acterized as a "heavy" one. Washington, 797 F.2d at 1465.
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ly, the requisite balance is styled as a conflict between the individu-
al defendant's constitutional right to retain an attorney of his choice
and a governmental or systemic interest in the need for "efficiency"
or "effective administration" in the criminal justice system. s2 Per-
haps predictably, in light of the tendency to understate the rights
side and overstate the government-interests side of the balance-a
criticism frequently made of balancing in general-S 3 1imitations on
the right to retain counsel of choice are not confined to a
defendant's selection of an unwilling, unqualified or unlicensed
attorney. 4
1. Effective Administration
The most commonly litigated limitation on the right to retain an
attorney of choice arises from the trial court's authority to control its
own docket."5 In the exercise of this inherent authority, a trial
court has wide discretion to make decisions affecting the administra-
tion of cases pending before it. 6 This discretion most frequently
comes into conflict with the right to retain counsel of choice
52 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir.
1969) (characterizing competing interest as a "desirable public need for the efficient and
effective administration of criminal justice."); United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 148
(6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. lies, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 n.8 (6th Cir. 1990))
(same); United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 950 (1st Cir. 1995) (balancing
'defendant's interest in choosing his counsel and the court's trial management needs.");
United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying similar balanc-
ing approach). See generally cases cited infra notes 55-62.
s See Strossen, supra note 50, at 1204. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 50.
4 See infra Parts II.B.1-3.
s The governmental interest said to be at stake in this context is frequently charac-
terized as an interest in economy or efficiency. See, e.g., Burton, 584 F.2d at 489 (dis-
cussing right to retain counsel of choice and stating that "[tihe public has a strong inter-
est in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice.'); Linton v. Perini,
656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981) (same).
16 See Linton, 656 F.2d at 209 ("A court must always keep control of its own dock-
et, but in doing so it must be reasonable and consider the constitutional right of a
defendant to have retained counsel of his choice.); Burton, 584 F.2d at 489 ("It is
firmly established that the granting or refusal of a continuance is a matter within the
discretion of the judge who hears the application, and is not subject to review absent a
clear abuse."); United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1098 (1st Cir. 1976) ('It is
axiomatic that the district court has inherent power to control its own docket to ensure
that cases proceed before it in a timely and orderly fashion."); United States v. Inman,
483 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1973) (recognizing accused's right to retain counsel of
choice and stating, '[b]ut the court also has the right to control its own docket to re-
quire that cases proceed in an orderly and timely fashion, and to that end to deny
motions for continuances.").
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through the decision to grant or deny a continuance requested by
the defense. 7 While a continuance may be requested for myriad
reasons, in this context, such requests are most commonly made
either to (i) accommodate a defendant's chosen counsel's schedul-
ing conflict or illness, 8 or (ii) to provide a defendant with addi-
tional time to obtain new counsel.5 9
s7 See, e.g., United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1987) (trial
rescheduled where defendant had not obtained counsel by the time of trial); United
States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Sampley v. Attorney
Gen. of N.C., 786 F.2d 610, 611-12 (4th Cir. 1986) (continuance requested due to
chosen counsel's scheduling conflict); United States v. La Monte, 684 F.2d 672 (10th
Cir. 1982) (defendant asserted that counsel of choice did not have adequate preparation
time); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 591-92 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same);
Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (6th Cir. 1971) (continuance requested due
to chosen counsel's medical condition). The grant or denial of a request for continuance
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
U.S. 575, 589 (1964); see also United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1016
(10th Cir. 1992) ("Because the factors influencing a particular case often vary, the district
court enjoys broad discretion on matters of continuances, even when the parties impli-
cate Sixth Amendment issues.'). The Fifth Circuit has identified the following
nonexhaustive six factors to be considered by the trial judge in passing on such a re-
quest:
(1) the length of the requested delay; (2) whether the lead counsel has an
associate who is adequately prepared to try the case; (3) whether other contin-
uances have been requested or granted; (4) the balanced convenience or in-
convenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; (5) wheth-
er the requested delay is for a legitimate reason, or whether it is dilatory and
contrived; (6) whether there are other unique factors present.
Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally cases cited infra
notes 58-59.
58 See, e.g., Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1013-14 (following denial of motion for
continuance, joint motion for reconsideration by filed government and defendant on
ground that defendant's chosen counsel was hospitalized); Sampley, 786 F.2d at 611-12
(continuance requested due to chosen counsel's scheduling conflict); Rankin, 779 F.2d at
956-57 (denial of continuance necessitated by defense counsel's scheduling conflict vio-
lated defendant's right to counsel of choice); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248,
256-58 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding trial court's denial of continuance motion premised
upon counsel's scheduling conflict even though defendant was tried in absence of attor-
ney as a result); Giacalone, 445 F.2d at 1241-42 (continuance requested due to chosen
counsel's medical condition); Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 299-300 (9th Cir.
1961) (defendant denied right to counsel of choice by trial court's refusal to grant con-
tinuance during which chosen, counsel could recover from hospital stay).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Coughlan, No. 93-50283, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 20720,
at *3-4 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 1994) (defendant requested one-week continuance on order to
obtain counsel of his choice); United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 564 (10th Cir.
1987) (continuance requested on morning of trial to permit defendant to retain, with
newly obtained funds, an attorney other than appointed counsel); Urquhart v. Lockhart,
726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (continuance requested to enable defendant to
obtain new counsel immediately prior to trial); United States v. Lowe, 569 F.2d 1113,
1116 (10th Cir. 1978) (same except request made during trial). See generally cases cited
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In passing on such a request, the trial court properly exercises
its discretion by striking "a delicate balance between the
defendant's ... right to adequate representation by counsel of his
choice and the general interest in the prompt and efficient adminis-
tration of justice."6" Therefore, the trial judge, acting in the name
of calendar control, must not arbitrarily and unreasonably interfere
with the right to retain counsel of choice, and the defendant must
not "assume that the right to choose counsel affords the right to
obtain a delay at his whim or caprice. " 61
In sum, while defendants have a constitutional right to retain
counsel of their choice, that right is limited by a significant interest
in maintaining effective administration of court calendars. While this
fundamental conflict requires a "careful balancing" of competing
considerations, a trial court's traditionally broad discretion to man-
age its own docket provides the flexibility and creativity necessary
to accommodate a defendant's choice, while not crippling the prog-
ress of its own calendar.62
infra note 62.
6C Candy, 569 F.2d at 1323; see United States v. Sandersfield, No. 95-6444, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 14749, at *6 (10th Cir. June 18, 1997); see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
61 Candy, 569 F.2d at 1323 (quoting United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 210 (4th
Cir. 1968)); see also United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1988) ('A
request for change in counsel cannot be considered justifiable if it proceeds from a
transparent plot to bring about delay."); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir.
1981) (Ihe right to counsel of choice may not be used to unreasonably delay trial.');
Leavitt, 608 F.2d at 1293 (observing that when a continuance is denied resulting in
accused's trial without representation it is usually because the defendant has "engage[d]
in a course of conduct which is dilatory and hinders the efficient administration of jus-
tice.'); Burton, 584 F.2d at 489 (quoting Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (stating that right to retain counsel of choice 'cannot be insisted upon in a
manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in c6urts of justice, and deprive such
courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same."); see also cases
cited infra note 62.
62 This flexible approach is also taken in response to motions for substitution of
counsel where trial court decisions are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1502, 1505-07 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
Brown v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 196 (1996) (no abuse of discretion by trial judge's
denial of motion for substitution of counsel although made two months in advance of
trial in which court left open possibility of renewing the motion and inference that
attomey-client relationship was thereafter mended); United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d
145, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1996) (no abuse of discretion by denial of request for substitution
of counsel one day before trial in which there was not a total lack of communication
between attorney and client); United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir.
1996) (trial court acted within its discretion in denying request for substitution of attor-
ney made on last day of trial and grounded in allegation unrelated to relationship with
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2. Conflicts of Interest
A second area in which a criminal defendant's right to retain
counsel of his choice has been limited is where chosen counsel has
been disqualified, over a defendant's objection, on the ground that
counsel is laboring under an actual or potential conflict of inter-
est.63 In contrast to the "effective administration" limitation,64 the
governmental or societal interest implicated in the conflict of inter-
est context is the systemic interest in the integrity of the judicial
system.6 s
The leading case on the extent to which a criminal defendant's
right to his chosen attorney may limited by his often competing
right to conflict-free representation is Wheat v. United States.66 In
Wheat, the petitioner, one of several co-defendants charged with,
inter alia, participating in an alleged drug distribution conspiracy,
moved to substitute as his counsel, attorney Iredale who was al-
ready representing two other co-defendants charged in the same
conspiracy, Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo.67 Gomez-
Barajas' negotiated plea agreement had not yet been approved by
the trial court; he therefore retained the option of withdrawing the
plea and proceeding to trial.68 Bravo pleaded guilty to a single
count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. His plea proceed-
current counsel); United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1995)
(no abuse of discretion where trial court refused to permit defendant's additional inter-
views of potential substitute attorneys); United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 893-95
(4th Cir. 1994) (finding abuse of discretion in denying defendant's motion to have attor-
ney retained by her family replaced with appointed counsel); United States v. Roston,
986 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1993) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing pre-trial motion for continuance in order to substitute attorney of choice).
63 In these cases, the defendant asserting his right to retain counsel of his choosing
is aware of the actual or potential conflict and is willing to waive his right to "conflict-
free counsel.' See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1988).
See supra Part ll.B.1.
63 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160 (stating that "the institutional interest in the rendition
of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple represen-
tation.n).
486 U.S. 153 (1988).
67 Id. at 154-55. The motion was made two days before trial was scheduled to
commence. Id. at 155, 157.
Id. at 155. Gomez-Barajas had been acquitted at an earlier trial of drug-related
charges common to those against the petitioner. Id.
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ings had been completed.69 Each of the co-defendants consented
to Iredale's joint representation and expressly waived their rights to
conflict-free counsel.70
The government objected to the petitioner's proposed substitu-
tion of attorney Iredale on two theories of conflict of interest. First,
in the event that Gomez-Barajas' plea was withdrawn or declined
by the court, the petitioner would likely be called to testify for the
government at Gomez-Barajas' subsequent trial. Iredale would then
be prevented from cross-examining the petitioner and thereby ham-
pered in his ability effectively to represent Gomez-Barajas.71 Sec-
ond, because the government had offered to modify its position
with regard to Bravo's sentence if Bravo would testify against the
petitioner, a similar inability effectively to cross-examine Bravo
would arise in the likely event that Bravo was called by the govern-
ment to testify against the petitioner.72 In response, the petitioner
characterized the government's theories as speculative, relied on his
right to counsel of choice, and emphasized each defendant's waiver
of his right to conflict-free representation.73
The Supreme Court in Wheat first characterized the Sixth
Amendment as designed to ensure the right to a fair trial, with an
ultimate concern for preserving the adversarial system.74 The Court
then observed that while the Amendment comprehends the right to
counsel of choice, that right has traditionally been limited by com-
peting societal and institutional interests which focus on the integri-
ty of the judicial system.75 In this context, the majority observed
that the danger of joint representation adheres in its potential to
dampen the ardor of counsel and hinder his ability to zealously
pursue the interests of each of his clients.76 Because such hindered
69 Id.
70 Id. at 157.
71 486 U.S. at 155-56.
7 Id. at 156. The government's theory was that a portion of the marijuana distribi
ed by Bravo reached the petitioner. Id.
'3 Id. at 156-57.
71 Id. at 158-59.
'1 Id. at 159-60. See also supra Part ll.B.1.
76 486 U.S. at 160. Quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (197
the Court commented:
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends
to prevent the attorney from doing . . . . [A] conflict may . . . prevent an
attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client
but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing
the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the
ut-
8),
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representation effects "[n]ot only the interest of a criminal defendant
but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in crimi-
nal cases," a defendant's waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel
does not automatically warrant approval of his choice of counsel.77
Thus, a trial court which discovers an actual conflict of interest may
properly decline a defendant's proffered waiver and require separate
representation over the defendant's choice of retained counsel.78
A trial court has broad discretion in passing on proffered waivers
and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.79
Moreover, in order to guide appellate review of trial court
decisions to accept or decline a defendant's waiver in such circum-
stances, courts "must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing
waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an
actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more
common cases where a potential for conflict exists. . . . ,o In sum,
while there is a presumption in favor of a defendant's chosen coun-
sel, that presumption may be overcome by facts demonstrating
either an actual, or serious potential for, conflict of interest.8
culpability of one by emphasizing that of another.
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160 (brackets and ellipses in original).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 161-62; see also United States v. Stites, 56 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1995)(declining proffer of waiver by former client of right to confidentiality where attorney
who earlier represented former client sought to represent co-defendant in same case).
The Wheat court also reasoned that "[fQederal courts have an independent interest in
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.' Wheat, 486 U.S. at
160.
" See Williams, 81 F.3d at 1325 (applying abuse of discretion standard on review
of trial court's disqualification of defendant's chosen counsel due to conflict of interest);
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1078-79 (3rd Cir. 1996) (trial court did not abuse
discretion by declining defendant's proffered waiver where serious potential for conflict
of interest existed); United States v. Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990) (no
abuse of discretion by trial court's refusal to effectuate defendant's waiver and disqualifi-
cation of defense counsel who was subject of related investigation); United States v.
Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing defendant's waiver of defense counsel's conflict of interest likely to arise
from government witness' testimony implicating counsel in criminal conduct).
80 Id. at 163.
' Id. at 164; see also United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (4th Cir.
1996) (no denial of right to counsel of choice by disqualification of chosen counsel who
earlier represented likely government witness); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d
201, 219 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendant's chosen counsel, who previously represented current
co-defendants in trial on similar charges, was properly disqualified).
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3. Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
The third significant limitation upon the right to retain counsel
of choice is found in the operation of "forfeiture statutes," which
authorize the seizure and forfeiture to the government of instrumen-
talities and proceeds of criminal activity.2  In this context, a
defendant's right to counsel of choice may be compromised or
denied by either a pre-trial 3 or post-trial"4 seizure and forfeiture
of assets needed to retain a particular attorney. In contrast to the
"effective administration" and "conflicts" limitations, which invoke
the vindication of some important "governmental interest" in cir-
cumscribing the right to counsel of choice, the forfeiture limitations
rest largely on the rationale that there is "no Sixth Amendment right
to spend another person's money for services rendered by an attor-
ney.""5 This rationale reflects the fictional legal principle of retroac-
82 See, for example, 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994) which provides in part: "[a]ll right,
title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the
United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section."
See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (subjects to forfeiture "all moneys . . . fumished or in-
tended to be fumished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in viola-
tion of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys . . .
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter."); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 853(a), (c) (1994).
83 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614 (1989).
See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 632 (1989).
S Id. at 626. Forfeiture is said to vindicate three govemmental interests, which may
roughly be characterized as pecuniary, restitutionary and economic. The pecuniary inter-
est is served by the govemment's distribution of forfeited assets to various agencies in
support of law enforcement efforts. Id. at 629. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994)
(creating Department of justice Assets Forfeiture Fund). The restitutionary interest is
sought to be served by statutory provisions permitting "rightful owners" to recover for-
feited assets before such assets become permanently retained by the government. Caplin
& Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629-30. The economic interest is vindicated by "the desire to
lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises . . . includ[ing] the
use of such economic power to retain private counsel.' Id. at 630. While each of these
govemmental interests might plausibly be characterized as sufficiently important to "bal-
ance" against a defendant's right to retain counsel of his choosing, the forfeiture cases
do not take this analytic approach. Id. at 626-29 (discussing govemment interests in
context of "petitioner's 'balancing analysis" but only to show lack of merit in
petitioner's approach). Rather, the primary rationale of the case law recognizing and
applying the forfeiture limitation is that the assets proposed to be used by a defendant
to retain his chosen counsel are not his property, and, therefore, he has no right to use
them to retain an attorney. Id. at 626 (analogizing defendant's claim of right to use
forfeitable assets to bank robber's claim of right to spend stolen money); United States
v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting contention that pre-trial sei-
zure of $9,020 denied defendant's right to retain chosen counsel because as a result of
forfeiture statute, the defendant "never had a legal right to the money [and] had no right
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tive vesting of title in which it is said that title to the forfeitable
asset(s) passes to the government upon commission of the acts
declared to be unlawful.8 6 Since the U.S. Supreme Court's com-
panion decisions in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States87 and United States v. Monsanto88 upholding seizure and
forfeiture of assets needed by criminal defendants to retain the
attorney of their choice, lower courts have consistently applied this
limitation without significant divergence of opinion.
This Part has considered the limited right of an accused with
sufficient resources to retain an attorney of his choice and made
clear that this right is firmly rooted in the Sixth Amendment. The
following Part will review the current state of the indigent accused's
"right" to secure counsel of choice and discuss the reasons which
have traditionally been cited against recognition of this "right" even
in qualified form.
Ill. CHOICE OF COUNSEL AND INDIGENCY
A. Inequity of Choice
The Sixth Amendment protects the right of an accused to se-
cure, through his own financial resources (or any other lawful
source), an attorney whom he personally chooses and prefers to
represent him.89 This right is but a corollary to the fundamentally
personal right of a criminal defendant to conduct his own defense,
to spend it on legal counsel.').
See generally United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111 (1993) (ex-
tensively discussing operation of forfeiture at common law and more modem statutory
forfeiture provisions). At least since United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890), the
courts have held that:
whenever a statute enacts that upon commission of a certain act specific prop-
erty used in or connected with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes
effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property
then vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected until judi-
cial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to
the United States at the time the offense is committed; and the condemnation,
when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and
alienations, even to purchasers in good faith.
Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17.
87 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
491 U.S. 600 (1989).
See supra Part II.A.
[Vol. 64: 1
1991998] THE SIXTH AMENDMENTAND INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
"for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."9"
While the Sixth Amendment's vindication of personal choice might
plausibly be argued to apply with equal vigor and dimension to
criminal defendants without regard to their financial condition, such
is not reality. A trial court's authority to appoint competent counsel
to an indigent accused without considering the defendant's prefer-
ence for a particular attorney is well settled-indigent criminal de-
fendants have no recognized right to counsel of their choosing.9'
It may, however, be argued that the Sixth Amendment right is
simply the right to "retain" counsel of choice, and this right so
described, applies equally without regard to one's financial ability
to exercise it. Thus, according to this view, it is not that the consti-
tutional right does not extend to the indigent but simply that a
collateral condition for which the government is not accountable,
i.e., indigency, prevents some persons from exercising their right to
retain the attorney they prefer.92 Yet, if the Constitution protects
the right to some (unspecified) degree of choice in the selection of
one's counsel, and it is well settled that it does,9 3 then that consti-
tutionally protected interest must be broader than merely the right
to "retain" counsel of one's choosing because, in its simplest form,
the right to "retain" an attorney with one's own money is merely a
recognition of basic property rights-a person may lawfully dispose
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
9' See, e.g., United States v. lies, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990) ("An indigent
defendant has no right to have a particular attorney represent him . . . . "); Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) ("Petitioner does not,
nor could it defensibly do so, assert that impecunious defendants have a Sixth Amend-
ment right to choose their counsel."); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)
('[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.');
United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[A]n indigent has no abso-
lute right to counsel of his choice."); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d
Cir. 1978) (stating that 'an indigent defendant does not have an absolute right to the
assignment of counsel of his or her own choice; rather, the appointment is left to the
sound discretion of the court."); United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 194, 197 (10th Cir.
1972) ("Selection of counsel [for indigent defendants] 'rests in the sound discretion of
the court."') (citation omitted); see also authorities cited supra note 7.
92 See generally United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
indigent's claimed right to counsel of choice and reasoning in part that "the government
is not responsible for [the defendant's] poverty, and could not, under any reasonable sys-
tem for the appointment of counsel, rectify all the consequences of the inequality of
wealth among criminal defendants."); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360-63 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (articulating analogous view in context of indigent's right to coun-
sel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (artic-
ulating analogous view in context of indigent's right to free transcript on appeal).
"3 See cases cited supra note 26.
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of his property (i.e., spend it) as he desires. If this is the sum of the
constitutionally protectable interest recognized by the "right to
retain an attorney of choice," this "property right" seems an odd
candidate for inclusion in the Sixth Amendment which exclusively
addresses trial and trial-related rights of criminal defendants.94
More significantly, however, if this were the sum of the consti-
tutional interests implicated by the counsel of choice "right," then
we should expect this "property-based" rationale to appear in the
case law, which it uniformly does not.9" Rather, the cases speak of
much broader interests such as "maintaining a vigorous adversary
system, ""' recognizing an accused's "free choice," "' and "respect
for the individual"98 as forming the basis of the counsel of choice
"right."99 The interest in personal choice protected by the Sixth
Amendment, while inclusive of, is, therefore, much broader than,
the simple right to expend one's own resources to "retain" an
attorney of choice.
Thus, the indigent's complete lack of choice in the selection of
his attorney is not merely an unfortunate side effect of the indigent's
impecuniousness but rather a governmental denial to the accused of
recognized constitutional interests having nothing to do with a
person's financial condition."° In a very real sense, the breadth of
the constitutional guarantee depends on the fiscal health of the
accused."' In fact, the principle that an indigent accused enjoys
See supra note 19; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1972)(discussing trial nature of various Sixth Amendment rights); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
560 (1965) (same).
9s See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 26.
Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1985).
97 Id.; see also United States v. Urbana, 770 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1991)("Like the sixth amendment right to self-representation, the right to counsel of choice,
'reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice independent of concem
for the objective faimess of the proceeding.") (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465
U.S. 259, 268 (1984)) (citation omitted).
9 United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Miller v.
Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1149 (4th Cir. 1997) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
9' See also supra Part II.A.
1oo See supra Part II.A (discussing values underlying the Sixth Amendment right to re-
tain counsel of one's choosing).
101 This unsettling conclusion is not merely a reflection of "the harsh reality that the
quality of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his ability to
retain the best counsel money can buy.' Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring). That "harsh reality' is only constitutionally tolerable if the
accused has been afforded the full panoply of rights to which he is entitled by the
Constitution. If, however, a criminal defendant is not afforded such rights, a constitution-
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no "right" to choose his attorney has become so well settled that
case law reveals few challenges to its basic operation, notwithstand-
ing the suspect bases from which the principle's continued vitality
derive.02
B. Rationales for Inequity of Choice
An indigent defendant's claim of right to be represented by an
attorney of his choosing is frequently rejected with little explanation
beyond rote citation to prior cases, which themselves articulate no
rationale.03 Nonetheless, three primary reasons for denying the
indigent's right of choice have emerged.' The rationales may
broadly be characterized as sounding in three flexible tools of the
judicial trade-governmental paternalism, administrative efficiency,
and administrative convenience.'05
1. Paternalism
The paternalistic approach is best exemplified by People v.
Fuller. 6 In Fuller, the court denied an indigent accused's ex parte
al deprivation cannot be justified by reference to "harsh realities." The Sixth Amendment
interests implicated by the counsel of choice right go beyond the mere right of an ac-
cused to spend his own money to obtain an attorney of his choosing; therefore, denying
an indigent accused such a choice is a wrongdoing of constitutional magnitude and
"harsh realities" are no defense. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
12 In one early federal case in which an indigent asserted a "choice of counsel"
claim, the court wrote:
When I first read the question [for review] I rather assumed that it would have
been so universally conceded that a prisoner did not have the right to tell the
court who the court should appoint to represent him that I did not expect to
find any authority on the point.
Wilson v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 661, 663 (W.D. Va. 1963).
103 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7; see also Tague, supra note 11, at 79 (com-
menting that the rule denying indigent's a right to counsel of choice usually "has been
announced by fiat"). See generally Ronald A. Case, Annotation, Indigent Accused's Right
to Choose Particular Counsel Appointed to Represent Him, 66 A.L.R. 3d 996 (1975).
See generally Case, supra note 103. See also infra Parts III.B.1-3.
105 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 11.4 (synthesizing the case law and articu-
lating three predominant rationales); Melinda Hardy, Supreme Court Review: Sixth
Amendment-Applicability of Right to Counsel of Choice to Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees,
80 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1154, 1173 n.135 (1990) (relying on LAFAVE & ISRAEL and
also stating three rationales); see also infra Parts III.B.1-3.
10 35 Misc. 189, 71 N.Y.S. 487 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1901). Fuller is dated; yet, in light
of the failure of more recent case law to articulate a rationale for refusing to recognize
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW[
application for assignment of an attorney of his choosing on the
ground that the defendant did not possess the requisite familiarity
with the bar intelligently to choose his own attorney.' 7 According
to this view, given trial judges' greater knowledge of the local bar,
they are in a better position than criminal defendants to assess the
skills and experience of attorneys; thus, they are the preferred per-
sons to appoint attorneys to represent the indigent."8
While governmental paternalism has been recognized as a
legitimate state interest, 9 the context in which that approval has
developed provides no support for judicial invocation of such an
interest as a means to deny a claim of an indigent accused of an
asserted constitutional right."' The legitimacy of paternalism as a
governmental interest developed as a judicially recognized philo-
sophical limitation upon the federal courts' power to invalidate
"protective" legislative goals,"' not as a doctrine which courts,
themselves, could invoke to justify rejection of constitutional claims
of criminal defendants." 2 In the years following the "Lochner-
era,"" during which the Court invalidated numerous federal stat-
utes" 4 whose protective purposes were viewed as mere "meddle-
some interferences,"". the notion of "substantive due process," in
whose name such statutory enactments were set aside, slowly be-
came a constitutional relic as the Court's philosophy shifted toward
the indigent's choice interests, see supra note 102 and accompanying text and infra note
119, completeness requires discussion of all the rationales which have traditionally, if
only rarely, been articulated.
107 Id.
108 See id.; Tague, supra note 11, at 79; see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7,
§ 11.4 (articulating similar rationale from the case law). Significantly, this rationale does
not purport to hold the indigent incapable of making an intelligent choice but only less
capable than someone else who presumably is more informed. The reasoning thus ig-
nores the fact that "[plersonal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right
to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the per-
sonal consequences of a conviction." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
109 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323 (1985)(discussing role of paternalism in substantive due process context and stating "[tihat day
is fortunately long gone, and with it the condemnation of rational paternalism as a legit-
imate legislative goal.").
o See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
12 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804-09 (2d ed. 1991).
113 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14 Between 1905 and 1934, the Court struck down approximately 200 statutory
economic regulations. STONE ET AL., supra note 112, at 802.
"' See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
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greater deference toward legislative "meddling."116 The more mod-
ern judicial loathe to reject paternalistic legislative goals is thus a
reflection of the Court's "refus[al] to sit as a 'superlegislature' to
weigh the wisdom of legislation" ' and, thus, provides no support
for a Fuller-based rationale in rejecting assertions of a right to coun-
sel of choice where there has been no contrary decision by a coor-
dinate branch of the government." 8
In light of more modern pronouncements, particularly in the
criminal law and procedure area, Fuller and similar rationales reflect
only the outmoded reasoning of a bygone era." 9 Since the height
116 STONE ET AL., supra note 112, at 804-09.
11 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
18 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides for appointment of counsel to
indigent criminal defendants in federal courts, states in part that "[r]epresentation shall be
provided for any financially eligible person who . . . is entitled to appointment of coun-
sel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(H)
(1994). The Act further provides that, unless the defendant waives his right to counsel,
'the United States magistrate or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the
[defendant] is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent
him.' Id. § 3006A(b). While the statute may be read to foreclose the possibility of a
defendant's choice in the selection of which attorney is appointed to represent him, its
text does not require such a conclusion. Indeed, far from revealing a clear Congressional
intent to abrogate an indigent's choice in the selection of appointed counsel, the "ap-
pointmenr language of the statute may be read as requiring only that the government
(through the court) make available to the accused an attorney, while simply not address-
ing the issue of whether a defendant has some right to select which attorney will be
appointed from among those made available under the Act.
It is not at all clear that the Act reflects a decision by Congress that the Sixth
Amendment does not comprehend some limited right of indigent criminal defendants to
have a voice in the selection of counsel appointed to represent them. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that, at the time of the statute's passage in 1964, no federal court
had held in a reported decision that indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional
right to select the attorney appointed to represent them. Search of LEXIS Genfed and
States Libraries, February 15, 1998. See Tague, supra note 11, at 73 (recognizing that
not until 1972 had an appellate court required a trial court to appoint an attorney re-
quested by a defendant. That decision was overruled. See Drumgo v. Superior Court of
Marin County, 506 P.2d 1007 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973)). Indeed,
judicial discussion of the issue is rare. See supra note 102. It thus seems highly implau-
sible that Congress even considered the constitutional issue. There having been no con-
gressional determination of the constitutionality of denying indigents a choice of counsel,
the statute is not entitled to the deference which may otherwise effect the Court's judi-
cial review of a decision of a coordinate branch of the federal govemment. See Kenneth
L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CF. REV. 75, 87 ('[N]h-
en there is no judgment by a legislature at all . . . there is little justification for any
presumption of constitutionality.).
"I Courts frequently repeat, though rarely explain, the principal that indigent defen-
dants have no right to counsel of their choice. See supra notes 7 and 91 and accompa-
nying text. The "well-settled" nature of the question has apparently obviated the need to
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of the protectionist approach, which traditionally justified denial of
an indigent's right to chosen counsel, the Supreme Court has more
recently "rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from
his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal
case."12 If the government's interest in safeguarding an accused
from his own perceived ignorance in deciding who should repre-
sent him is sufficiently compelling to warrant denial of his claim of
constitutional entitlement to a voice in choosing his own counsel,
there is no rational basis for resisting other governmental encroach-
ments upon a defendant's decisions regarding his own defense. 2 '
Followed too far, such a road could lead to the intolerable require-
ment that criminal defendants demonstrate the wisdom of their
defense strategies to the court for approval.'22 As the Court stated
articulate its justification. See, e.g., supra note 102. The difficulty, however, with thisjudicial approach, is its tendency to elevate the comfort which flows from what is famil-
iar over the justice which may be achieved through what is not. Thus, while modem
criminal law has increasingly recognized the individual's interest in making personal
choices regarding his defense, the traditional rule denying indigents a choice in selecting
appointed counsel has remained immune from even slight change. See, e.g., Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 806 (1975); see also cases cited infra note 120.
120 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which rejected the notion that suspects in
police custody cannot voluntarily and intelligently decide to waive Miranda rights. SeeMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.452, 476 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109); Edward v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (same). While adefendant's incompetency would provide a ground for refusing to give effect to hisdecisions regarding the conduct of his case, the Fuller rationale is not premised upon
such concerns. See supra note 108.
121 Indeed the practice of weighing governmental interests seems to resemble an
implicit analytical balancing approach toward resolving the claim of right. Yet, while
"balancing' has increasingly been employed to resolve conflicts between individual rights
and govemmental interests, see generally Aleinikoff, supra note 50, passim, it seems at
best questionable whether "balancing' should be employed to determine the existence of
the claimed constitutional right in the first instance. Moreover, even assuming that 'bal-
ancing' is appropriate, noticeably absent from the court's consideration of the competing
interests are the weighty systemic and individual interests served by the right to counsel
of choice which apply without regard to indigency. See supra Part II.A.
122 Such an evidentiary requirement would be inconsistent with the fundamentalpremise of the "choice-interests" recognized by the Sixth Amendment-respect for theindividual. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1965) (stating that "even in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on
conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed
to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 'with
open eyes."); accord Amaker v. Lacy, 941 F. Supp. 1340, 1352 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quot-ing Maldonado in response to defendant's election to testify on his own behalf in spite
of counsel's advice); Johnstone v. Kelly, 633 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
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in Faretta, while recognizing the right of a defendant to dispense
with counsel and proceed pro se, irrespective of his lawyering
skills:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations
that go to the substance of the accused's position before the law....
What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned
into fetters .... To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circum-
stances in which he, though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of
making an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional
safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms.
When the administration of the criminal law ... is hedged about as
it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to
deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with
some of these safeguards ... is to imprison a man in his privileges and
call it the Constitution.123
Thus, neither misplaced notions of paternalism, nor an indigent
accused's supposed inability to assess the quality of available coun-
sel as accurately as a trial judge, warrant the conclusion that the
Sixth Amendment does not encompass at least a limited voice for
the indigent defendant in the selection of his appointed coun-
sel.124
2. Administrative Efficiency
A second primary rationale for refusing indigents a constitution-
al right to choose counsel appointed to them is that allowance of
choice will "disrupt the even handed distribution of assignments" by
burdening the more experienced attorneys and giving advantage to
repeat offenders who will monopolize the best attorneys. 2 ' This
rev'd, 808 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1986) ("When a criminal defendant elects to stand at the
Bar in his own defense, and he does so knowingly, voluntarily and unequivocally, a
court is bound by the Constitution to honor that election, however suicidal it may ap-
pear to be."). See generally supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
123 422 U.S. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McMann, 317 U.S. 269,
279-80 (1942)).
214 This conclusion is bolstered by consideration of both the breadth of the Sixth
Amendment interests being asserted (which exist independently of the mere ability to
pay for an attorney, see supra Part II.A) and the repayment obligations imposed upon
the indigent by uniformly applicable recoupment statutes. See infra Part IV.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that
'[plermitting the defendant to select the lawyer he wishes to represent him ... [would
cause] serious disruption to the even-handed distribution of assignments' and afford a
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"efficiency rationale" for rejecting the constitutional claim of
indigents to choice of counsel has also been stated in alternative
formulations. In United States v. Thompson,126 for example, the
court reasoned that permitting an indigent to select his own counsel
could raise the concern of "placing too many burdens on any one
lawyer" and ultimately invite reluctance on the part of attorneys to
accept appointments.'27 In addition, the right of choice has been
said to "give hostile or disruptive defendants an incentive to make
impossible demands upon the court [such as] requests for unavail-
able lawyers or lawyers unqualified to handle a particular mat-
ter."12 While governmental efficiency is never a particularly per-
suasive reason for rejecting a constitutional claim,'29 each of these
measure of advantage of access to habitual offenders); see also United States v. Ely, 719F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting claimed right of indigent to counsel of choice
and reasoning in part that 'indigent defendants cannot be allowed to paralyze the sys-
tem by all flocking to one lawyer.'); United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F.Supp. 683, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (reasoning that permitting right of choice would, among
other things, create risk of 'imposing too many burdens on any one lawyer'); People v.
Manchetti, 175 P.2d 533, 537 (Cal. 1946) (recognition of choice "would allow a popu-lar attorney to have the courts marking time to serve his convenience.'); People v. Fitz-gerald, 105 Cal. Rptr. 458, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (recognition of indigent's choice of
counsel could ogive hostile or disruptive defendants an incentive to make impossible
demands upon the court [such as] requests for unavailable lawyers or lawyers unquali-
fied to handle a particular matter.'); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 11.4(articulating similar rationales from the case law).
126 56 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
127 Id. at 688-89.
,28 Fitzgerald, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 466; see also Manchetti, 175 P.2d at 537 (recognition
of choice "would allow a popular attorney to have the courts marking time to serve his
convenience.').
" The suspect nature of administrative convenience as a justification for constitution-
al infringements was articulated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), which
said:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudi-
cation. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Pro-
cess Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and effi-
cacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Id. (rejecting administrative convenience rationale for statutory scheme which automat-ically declared children of unwed fathers wards of the state upon the death of their
mother); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 628 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)(referring to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and stating "program
efficiency .. . cannot in itself . . . provide a purpose sufficiently important to justify aninfringement on fundamental constitutional rights. If it could, its reach would be limitless[because] it is probably more efficient in most cases for Government to operate without
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rationales is subject to the following more fundamental criticisms.
a. Inadequate Evaluation of Competing Interests
In each case in which the claim of choice has been rejected in
favor of an efficiency-based governmental interest, the deciding
court has failed to adequately consider the competing interests at
stake in recognizing some limited choice in the selection of one's
counsel. 3 ' The right to select an attorney of choice serves the sys-
temic and individual interests of maintaining the health of our ad-
versarial system of criminal justice and promoting individual auton-
omy in controlling one's own defense. 3' Permitting an indigent
some voice in the selection of his counsel will, furthermore, pro-
mote a defendant's confidence in his lawyer and respect for the law
which, in terms of the communication, trust and disclosure essential
to a healthy attorney-client relationship, will contribute to a greater
quality of legal representation.132
Moreover, it can be expected that a greater stability and trust
between counsel and client will cause a proportional decline in the
need for pre-trial motions for continuances and post-conviction
claims of ineffective assistance.'33 Each of these predictable effects
is particularly important in this context. They each tend to increase
regard to the obstacles of the Constitution than to attend to them.'); Sherbert v. Vemner,
374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (recognizing that administrative inconvenience will not
justify burdening free exercise of religion absent showing that it presents substantial
difficulty).
', See cases cited supra notes 125-26. See generally supra Part II.A. See also Case,
supra note 103. One notable exception is United States v. Davis which did consider a
defendant's increased confidence in his attorney in the context of governmental efficien-
cy concerns while nonetheless denying the defendant's claim of choice. 604 F.2d 474,
478 (7th Cir. 1979).
See supra Part II.A.
1 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text; see also In re Sealed Case, 124
F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081 (1998) (recognizing that limitations upon attomey-client privilege, which itself is
founded upon trust, would deter disclosure and thereby "clearly impair the provision of
legal services.'); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Cal. 1973) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (stating that recognizing a defendant's choice of counsel 'is one method for
increasing his confidence that he is being provided competent counsel"); United States v.
Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
"3' See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (recognizing link
between "proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges" and relationship of trust between
attorney and client). Many pre-trial motions for continuances arise from defendants' re-
quests to substitute counsel with whom they are dissatisfied. See cases supra note 62.
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administrative efficiency, the concern for which has been cited as ajustification for denying an accused's claimed right of choice.13 4
Yet, despite the substantial benefits to be realized from accord-
ing an accused some voice in the selection of his counsel, the
wealth of case law denying such claims fails nearly uniformly to
take these interests into account.3 In light of this methodological
weakness, when coupled with a consideration of the repayment
obligations discussed infra which are now uniformly imposed upon
indigents, there is little to suggest that, properly considered, the
indigent's claim of right to a voice in the selection of his attorney is
not considerably more significant than the law has previously
recognized.
b. Inaccurate Characterization of Claimed Right
A second method by which the courts have elevated the gov-
ernmental interests in efficiency over an indigent accused's voice in
the selection of appointed counsel has been artificially to inflate the
breadth of the holding allegedly required to give effect to such
choice and then to criticize the flaws of establishing such a broad-
based legal proposition.136 For example, in People v. Fitzger-
ald,137 the court denied the defendant's claimed "inchoate consti-
tutional right to nominate the counsel assigned to him" on the
ground that vesting less than ultimate and exclusive authority in the
trial court to appoint counsel could invite "impossible demands
upon the court" from "hostile or disruptive defendants" including
requests for unavailable or unqualified lawyers. 38
Recognizing a Sixth Amendment right of an accused to counsel
of his choice, however, need not be so broad as to license defen-
dants to resort to abusive or dilatory tactics. Indeed, the potential
for abuse should rarely countenance denying an otherwise justifi-
" See cases cited supra note 125.
135 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., People v. Fitzgerald, 105 Cal. Rptr. 458, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (rea-
soning that recognizing right of choice could open door to 'impossible demands' from
"hostile or disruptive defendants'); United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F.
Supp. 683, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating that "defendant may not name the lawyer
whom the court must appoint' and refusing to "confer upon every indigent defendant
the power of 'senatorial courtesy' with respect to the court's appointee'); Wilson v.
United States, 215 F. Supp. 661, 663 (N.D. Va. 1963) (same).
"' 105 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
138 Id.
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able rule of law. 39 This principle is perhaps most compelling
where, as here, there is a substantial constitutional basis for the
right being asserted. There is nothing to suggest that if the right to
choice were recognized, courts would be unable adequately to
respond to occasional attempted abuses of the type hypothecated by
the Fitzgerald court.4
In fact, in the case of a defendant with sufficient resources to
retain his own counsel, where the Sixth Amendment right to choice
is settled,'4 ' trial courts have demonstrated little difficulty in utiliz-
ing their traditionally broad discretionary authority to flexibly re-
spond to perceived abuses of the constitutional right.'42 In the
context of motions for continuance, for example, courts have in-
voked an analogous interest in the "effective administration of court
calendars"'43  and applied "a delicate balance between the
defendant's ... right to adequate representation by counsel of his
choice and the general interest in the prompt and efficient adminis-
tration of justice."'44 This test has proved workable without afford-
"" Courts have repeatedly refused to accept the argument that the potential for abuse
provides a sufficient ground for rejecting otherwise permissible laws. See, e.g., United
States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995) (*The mere potential for abuse of
prosecutorial bargaining power is an insufficient basis for foreclosing [plea] negotiation
altogether."); Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654 (1994) (rejecting challenge
to Missouri's use tax scheme by characterizing petitioner's claim as resting on "the po-
tential for abuse" and noting that "we have never deemed a hypothetical possibility of
favoritism to constitute discrimination that transgresses constitutional commands."); Thun-
der Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 216 (1994) ("The potential for abuse of [a
position created by the Mine Act] appears limited" and "petitioner has failed to demon-
strate that such abuse . . . cannot be remedied on an individual basis."); Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989) (rejecting challenge to
federal statute on the ground of potential abuse and reasoning "'[e]very criminal law
carries with it the potential for abuse, but a potential for abuse does not require a
finding of facial invalidity.") (quoting lower court opinion); Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (responding to litigant's argument that government motions to
disqualify defense counsel carry with them the potential for abuse and noting that "trial
courts are undoubtedly aware of [the] possibility" and would have to "take it into con-
sideration" when deciding such motions).
14 See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text. For a discussion of this Article's
response to these and other concems raised by the recognition of an indigent's limited
right to counsel of choice, see infra Parts V.B-C.
,' See cases cited supra note 26.
142 See generally supra Part ll.B.1.
4 See generally supra Part ll.B.
', Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); see United States v.
Sandersfield, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 14749, at *5 (10th Cir. June 18, 1997); United
States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1969); see also supra Part
1.B.1.
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ing defendants "the right to obtain delay at [their] whim or
caprice.' 4' Neither the Fitzgerald court, nor others articulating
similar rationales, have adequately explained why such an approach
would be unworkable in the present context.146
Recognition of a carefully limited right of the indigent to a
voice in the appointment of his attorney could vindicate Sixth
Amendment interests without diminishing the courts' power to
respond to abusive tactics. 47 As with the right to retain counsel of
choice, the constitutional interest of the indigent need not be abso-
lute. Indeed, the carefully tailored limitations developed in that
context, pertaining to lay representation, disbarred former attorneys,
and conflicts of interest,'48 may each equally limit the indigent's
right to an appointed attorney of his choosing.'49 In addition, fur-
ther limitations could be developed to ease any disruption to "the
even-handed distribution of assignments."' While the precise
contours of the right would best be developed in the context of
actual cases and controversies,' the perceived dangers of recog-
,4S Candy, 569 F.2d at 1323; see also supra Part ll.B.1.
" Indeed, courts usually do not explain their rationale at all in this area. See supra
notes 102 and 119 and accompanying text. Those courts that do articulate this justifica-
tion effectively reach their decision by simply presuming that indigent defendants will so
frequently be disruptive that the right of choice should be denied uniformly without re-
sort to individualized determination. Because courts have never recognized a right of
indigent defendants to select which attorney will be appointed to represent them, there
is no factual basis at all for this conclusion. As recognized elsewhere, "[p]rocedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination.' Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972). Yet the "ease with which [such decisions are]
reached suggests the worthlessness of the achievement." United States v. Salemo, 481
U.S. 739, 759 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 See infra Parts IV.B-C.
148 See supra Part 11.1 (discussing limitations on Sixth Amendment right to retain
counsel of choice).
49 The interests sought to be achieved through such limitations are no less applicable
in the context of indigent representation. See infra Part V.C.
18' For a discussion regarding the proposal made by this Article, see infra Part V.
.SI Like the legislative process, the difficulty of attempting to predict in advance all of
the possible effects and contingencies of a new rule of law is daunting. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125-136, 128 (1961) (discussing the "open texture' of law
and stating that 'lilt is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative
one) that we labour under . . . handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously
and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be used
without further official direction on particular occasions."). Once implemented, however,
experience thereunder will predictably highlight its subtle weaknesses which may then
be "fleshed out" by further interstitial judicial decisionmaking. As noted in ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115-16 (1965), this role is particularly appropriate
for the judiciary:
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nizing a right of choice for the indigent could be addressed by a
flexible approach similar to that followed in addressing continuance
motions.' 2
As the Supreme Court has recognized elsewhere, viewing
people "one-dimensionally" (as potential abusive litigants), when a
finer perception could readily be achieved by assessment on an
individualized basis, is undoubtedly efficient, but possesses an
unsettling potential for overbroad deprivations of substantial
rights.'53 Indigent criminal defendants are individuals. They are
not just members of a group whose distinguishing characteristic may
conclusively be presumed to be a tendency toward abusive litiga-
tion tactics. Denying such individuals a voice in appointing their
counsel cannot, therefore, be justified by trial courts' largely
unanchored anxieties over administrative efficiency.
3. Administrative Convenience
Closely aligned with the efficiency rationale for denying
indigent accused's claims of choice in the selection of appointed
counsel, the third leading justification sounds in administrative
convenience. According to this rationale, the convenience of an
appointment system that ignores choice may be preferred because
the Sixth Amendment guarantees only competent counsel." 4 As
One of the chief faculties of the judiciary, which is lacking in the legislature
and which fits the courts for the function of evolving and applying constitu-
tional principles, is that the judgment of courts can come later, after the hopes
and prophecies expressed in legislation have been tested in the actual work-
ings of our society; the judgment of courts may be had in concrete cases that
exemplify the actual consequences of legislative or executive actions. . . . [l]t
may be added that the opportunity to relate a legislative policy to the flesh-
and-blood facts of an actual case ... to observe and describe in being what
the legislature may or may not have foreseen as probable-this opportunity as
much as, or more than, anything else enables the [c]ourt[s] to appeal to the
nation's second thought.
Id.
152 See generally supra Part II.B.1; see also infra discussion Part V.
ISI Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 655 (1972) (invalidating Illinois statute pursuant
to which children of unwed father were automatically declared state wards upon death
of mother based upon presumption that father was unfit single parent).
1 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 11.4 (articulating similar rationale from the
case law); Tague, supra note 11, at 86; see also Greene v. Coughlin, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1691, at *41-42 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1995) (observing that indigent criminal defen-
dants have no right to choose counsel because "authorities may reasonably value an
even distribution of assignments and the convenience of an appointment system that
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with the paternalistic and efficiency justifications, the courts' conve-
nience-based rejection of the indigent's claimed right to counsel of
choice is fundamentally flawed. It both improperly collapses dis-
crete constitutional interests and fails to explain the basis for its
disparate definition of Sixth Amendment rights for the indigent.
a. Collapsed Rights
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment re-
quires that an accused be represented by an attorney "acting in the
role of an advocate." lss Thus, the right to counsel is the right to
the "effective assistance of counsel,""' which requires at a mini-
mum, that the prosecution's case be made to survive "the crucible
of meaningful adversarial testing."'57 Yet, effective advocacy is not
the whole of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. A criminal defendant
has a settled, albeit limited, constitutional right to be represented by
an attorney whom she personally prefers and has chosen to repre-
sent her.' While both are encompassed within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee, the right to counsel of choice and the right
to effective assistance are distinct, and enjoyment of one will not
excuse a deprivation of the other.'59 Blurring this distinction, the
convenience rationale "conveniently" subsumes the defendant's
independent right of choice within the right to competent assistance
and then purports to indicate that if an accused has received com-
petent assistance, he should not be heard to complain of being
deprived of the right to counsel of choice. Yet, "constitutional rights
ignores [such] preferences . . .
155 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967).
"6 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); see generally United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656.
See generally supra Part II.
s9 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that
'[w]hile .. . related, as they all are within the parameters of the Sixth Amendment's
right to the assistance of counsel, the right to choice of counsel is distinct from the
right to adequate assistance of counsel. The fact that one is infringed does not indicate
one way or the other whether the other is infringed.'); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d
1318, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that whether the effective assistance of counsel was
rendered was irrelevant because '[t]he claimed deprivation is an arbitrary encroachment
on the right to counsel of choice not a claim of ineffective assistance); United States v.
Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1963) (reversing conviction where defendant was
denied right to counsel of choice, even though imposed counsel was 'extremely compe-
tent' throughout the trial).
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are not fungible goods," 6' which can easily be replaced. Rather,
they "come to th[e] Court with a momentum for respect"'61 which
less compelling interests like governmental efficiency simply do not
command.
Besides improperly collapsing distinct constitutional rights into
a general right to "competency," the administrative convenience
rationale suffers from the additional fundamental flaw that it lacks
any principled basis from which to prevent it from abrogating the
right to choice entirely.62 If receiving the effective assistance of
counsel at trial was sufficient to remedy a violation of the right to
counsel of choice, then the defendant's right to choose his attorney
would be an "empty exhortation."'63 Only where a defendant's
imposed attorney rendered constitutionally inadequate assistance
would an avenue of relief lie for deprivations of the right to counsel
of choice. 64 This framework would not only inevitably result in
greater incidents of meritless appellate claims of ineffective assis-
tance (as the only way to obtain review of counsel of choice claims)
but also contravene settled law. 6s
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a convicted
defendant to demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently, and
such deficient representation was prejudicial.'66 Unprofessional
160 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 44 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
,' Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
162 See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
1'3 Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985) (by shifting analysis away
from defendant's right to make choice, 'requiring a showing of prejudice would obliter-
ate the heretofore recognized right of the accused to counsel of his choice . . .);
Burton, 584 F.2d at 517 (Spottswood, J., dissenting) (arguing that "if proficiency [of
counsel] were the lone predicate of harmlessness the constitutional guarantee of freedom
to select one's paid counsel would be an empty exhortation.'); see also Candy, 569
F.2d at 1326; Johnston, 318 F.2d at 290 (reversing conviction where defendant denied
right to counsel of choice, even though imposed counsel was 'extremely competent'
throughout the trial).
1I This state of the law would improperly shift the focus of the right to counsel of
choice from 'respect for the individual' to the result obtained by substituted counsel
and thereby ignore the very basis for the right to counsel of choice by "lock[ing] the
accused into his first selection of counsel unless he can prove conduct rising to the
level of constitutional ineffectiveness.' See Mintzes, 761 F.2d at 286; see also Bland v.
California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting similar
reasoning).
"I5 See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note
28.
166 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (counsel's performance is
deficient when it fails below an objective standard of reasonable professional compe-
tence). Deficient representation is prejudicial when "there is a reasonable probability
213
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errors not material to the result of the proceeding do not warrant
relief.167 Yet, where an accused is denied the right to be represent-
ed by counsel of his choice, courts have held that prejudice is not a
prerequisite to relief.168 Thus, the framework resulting from the
administrative convenience rationale not only promotes inefficiency
through imposing extraordinary pleading requirements as a condi-
tion to appellate relief, but also effectively creates a prejudice re-
quirement which contradicts the majority of the case law on the
issue.
b. Unjustified Definitional Distinctions
The convenience justification, however, could alternatively be
read more narrowly. Perhaps the rationale is not that the breadth of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee to all criminal defendants is compe-
tent counsel, but only that such is the full extent of the
Amendment's guarantee to indigent criminal defendants, and there-
fore, the indigent accused's preference for choice may be sacrificed
in the interest of efficiency in an appointment system. 69 Indeed,
this formulation would avoid the criticism of improperly blurring the
Sixth Amendment distinction between "competency" and "choice,"
and all of the difficulties flowing from such analytical and constitu-
tional impropriety.70 Yet, while eluding those objections, this al-
ternative view is no more persuasive. By defining the breadth of
Sixth Amendment rights for indigents more narrowly than for non-
indigents, and only then considering the governmental interest in
the convenient operation of an appointment system, the conve-
nience rationale employs a definitional discrimination of an
invidious kind.'7'
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is one "sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id.
167 Id.
16 See cases cited supra note 28 and accompanying text.
169 See Tague, supra note 11, at 85-86 (recognizing this rationale from the case law).
170 See supra Part III.B.3.a.
171 Within the efficiency-based context, denying indigents some limited right in the se-
lection of their appointed counsel arguably implicates two methods of discriminatory
govemmental action. The first, as noted in Part IIl.B.3.b., is a "definitional" discrimina-
tion which initially defines the extent of Sixth Amendment rights with reference to the
economic status of the accused; the second, and more obvious, is a "treatment" discrimi-
nation which gives legal effect to the interests of non-indigents in choice of counsel
while simultaneously denying legal effect to the choice interests of indigents. The dis-
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If indeed there is justification in beginning the analysis by
disparately defining the scope of Sixth Amendment rights, the con-
venience justification does not reveal it. Discrimination on the basis
of wealth is a constitutional violation of the first magnitude.'
7 2
While "[tihe Constitution does not require things which are different
in fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the same," 3
the government may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, engage in definitional discrimination with regard
to constitutional rights based solely on the wealth of the ac-
tinction is most clearly revealed by comparing the method of reasoning in the "limita-
tions" cases discussed supra Part II.B with the approach of the cases in the immediate
Parts II.B.1-3. In the former group, courts employ a balancing approach which explicitly
accords weight to the non-indigent's constitutional interests in selection of her own
attorney and then metaphorically "balances" those interests against countervailing govem-
mental interests. In the latter group, however, the same constitutional interests in choice
are in fact implicated but are defined away and, therefore, given no weight in relation
to the asserted government interest in appointment system efficiency. The instant discus-
sion addresses only the "definitional" discrimination.
Indeed, it is doubtful that indigents and non-indigents are sufficiently similarly situat-
ed to implicate equal protection scrutiny of the "treatment" discrimination. The Equal
Protection Clause is concerned only with disparate treatment of "similarly situated" indi-
viduals. Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that
the Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.'); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("The Equal
Protection Clause directs that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'")
(quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Because indi-
viduals may possess innumerable differences, the search for differences is a search for
"relevant" differences. That inquiry is determined with reference to the government pur-
poses sought to be achieved by the challenged action. See STONE ET AL., supra note
112, at 536-37. Thus, in the "treatment" discrimination context, the factual economic
differences between indigents, who require court appointments, and non-indigents, who
do not require the court's intervention, are arguably sufficiently related to the
government's interest in promoting appointment system efficiency (a subject which bears
little relation to the non-indigent) to warrant the conclusion that the two groups are not
'similarly situated" for purposes of equal protection jurisprudence. The different treatment
of indigents and non-indigents is, therefore, arguably justified by the relevant differences
between the two groups. For an equal protection discussion of what this Article has
denominated "treatment" discrimination, see Tague, supra note 11, at 87-89 (arguing in
favor of equal protection analysis and observing that the argument has "considerable
merit"). The argument in Tague's article has correctly been characterized as "not very
convincing." Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 54 n.235 (1986).
172 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963) (both due process and
equal protection require that counsel be appointed to indigents during their first appeal
as a matter of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956) (both due process
and equal protection require that an indigent defendant be provided with a transcript,
free of charge, when necessary to make first appeal as of right meaningful).
"3 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
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cused. 74 When it attempts to do so, "an unconstitutional line has
been drawn between rich and poor."17s
The primary objection to the efficiency justification is the char-
acter of the government's a priori discrimination between indigents
and non-indigents in defining the scope of Sixth Amendment rights.
By approaching the relevant inquiry, i.e., whether administrative
convenience in appointments is sufficient justification for denying
an indigent's claim to counsel of choice, having already defined
away the constitutional interests being asserted, the rationale "de-
cide[s] the question in advance in [the] very way of putting it."'76
Indeed, the underlying premise of the efficiency justification is that
the indigent is entitled only to a "watered-down version" 77 of the
Sixth Amendment rights extended to the non-indigent. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that given this manner of approaching the ques-
tion, the government's asserted interest in efficiency is held suffi-
cient to justify ignoring an indigent's claim to his choice of
counsel.""7
174 See cases cited supra note 173. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that
"[n]o State shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompass-
es the core equal protection guarantee applicable to the federal government. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-50 (1954). The judicial underpinnings of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on discrimination against the indigent may be found in both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Douglas, 372
U.S. at 355-58; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-19; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555,
566 (1996) (observing that the Griffin line of cases "reflect[s] both equal protection and
due process concems'); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) ("The precise ratio-
nale for the Griffin and Douglas line of cases has never been explicitly stated, some
support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment."). Because due process and
equal protection principles shade subtly into each other in this area, judicial inquiry
should 'inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one
hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on the other. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at
566.
'75 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357.
176 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943) (criticiz-
ing the tendency of "balancing" tests on this basis which compare rights and interests at
disparate levels of abstraction).
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) ("[Rlights protected against state
invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are not watered-down
versions of what the Bill of Rights guarantees.') (Douglas, J., supplemental opinion).
17 "The starting point of a decision," Justice Douglas once observed, "usually indi-
cates the result." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This
point is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the Court's "strict scrutiny" jurisprudence
in the equal protection context which has been described as "strict in theory, but fatal
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While it may be argued that the factual disparity in economic
status between indigents and non-indigents is sufficient to remove
them from the class of "similarly situated' 79  individuals with
which the equal protection guarantee is concerned, 8 ' this argu-
ment overlooks the point that the discrimination at issue-defining
the relevant constitutional interests of indigents more narrowly than
for non-indigents- 1"has no legitimate governmental purpose in
relation to which the relevance of this factual disparity may be ana-
lyzed. 82 The definitional discrimination is not justified by a rele-
vant difference between indigents and non-indigents. Because the
discrimination is wholly unrelated to the economic disparity be-
tween the two groups, the factual disparity thus raised is a distinc-
tion without an equal protection difference.'83 Even assuming,
however, that the financial condition of an accused is relevant to
values underlying the right to choice in the selection of an attorney,
as Part IV discusses, the increased prevalence of reimbursement
statutes, which impose repayment obligations upon defendants who
receive appointed counsel legal services, justifies an attempt to align
more closely the defense services for indigents with those of non-
indigents.'84 This alignment should commence by rethinking the
Sixth Amendment interests implicated by an indigent's claim to
choice in his appointed counsel.
in fact.' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment).
'I" See Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); see also supra note 171.
180 See supra note 171 (making this argument in the context of 'treatment' as op-
posed to "definitional" discrimination).
18' See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional values
underlying right to counsel of choice).
181 See discussion supra note 172 (explaining that in determining whether individuals
or groups are similarly situated for purposes of equal protection, the analysis focuses on
differences which are relevant to the governmental purpose sought to be achieved by
the complained of action).
183 Compare this conclusion with the discussion pertaining to "treatment" discrimi-
nation in supra note 172.
'" See infra Part IV.
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IV. RECOUPMENT STATUTES
A. Effect
While Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right to counsel to
state criminal defendants, it did not address whether, and under
what circumstances, states could recover the costs of providing
counsel to such defendants."' Currently, every state and the fed-
eral government has enacted a statutory recovery system designed
to recoup all or some of the costs associated with the government's
constitutional obligation to provide counsel to indigent criminal
defendants.86 While these statutory recovery systems vary widely,
they generally operate to require criminal defendants who are indi-
gent at the time of their criminal proceedings, and who are appoint-
ed an attorney to represent them, to repay all or a portion of the
costs of their legal defense when they subsequently obtain the
means to do so. I"7 Despite the uniform implementation of such
statutory repayment obligations, which conscript defendants' assets
through seizures, liens and other security devices,'88 to pay for
18' See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 104 (Alaska 1995) (citations omitted). See generally
Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of State Re-
coupment Statutes Permitting State to Recover Counsel Fees Expended for Benefit of
Indigent Criminal Defendants, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 597 (1985).
1O' Definitions of indigency, like property exemptions, vary widely from state to state.
For instance, some statutes require repayment only in the event of conviction, while
others impose repayment obligations regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. Com-
pare FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 27.56 (renumbered as 938.29) (West 1997) (assessing attor-
ney fees and costs only upon convicted defendants) with OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(6)
(1997) (providing recoupment provisions applicable to all defendants for whom counsel
has been appointed). See State v. Arms, 653 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that Section 135.055(6) "applies to all individuals for whom counsel is appoint-
ed, regardless of the outcome of the prosecution.0). The Supreme Court in Fuller v. Ore-
gon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), upheld this distinction against an equal protection challenge.
"8 Lien provisions are common in state recoupment statutes. See, e.g., CAL PENAL
CODE § 987.8(0 (West 1997); FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 27.56 (renumbered as 938.29)
(West 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455(b) (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-40 (Law. Co-
op. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-11 (Michie 1988). The use of lien provisions
as enforcement mechanisms in such statutes has generally been approved. See, e.g.,
State v. Williams, 343 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1977) (upholding state recoupment statute which
sought recovery of expended resources by creating lien against indigent defendant's real
and personal property); Stroinski v. Office of Pub. Defender, 338 A.2d 202 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975) (upholding provision of recoupment statute which required that a
lien be filed against indigent defendant's property where value of public defender servic-
es appeared to exceed $150).
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legal defense costs, indigent criminal defendants have not been
extended a corresponding voice in choosing which attorney is ap-
pointed to represent them.
If indigent criminal defendants possess a constitutional basis for
their claim to a voice in the selection of their appointed counsel in
the absence of considering their repayment obligations, and it cer-
tainly appears that they do,'89 reimbursement statutes should only
improve their constitutional footing. To begin determining the mer-
its of this view, the following section will consider the governmen-
tal interests legislatures seek to further through statutory reimburse-
ment schemes and discuss whether such interests impact the analyt-
ical framework for considering indigent claims to a right to counsel
of choice.
B. Governmental Interests
In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has given general
approval to the primary purpose sought to be achieved through
recoupment statutes-replenishment of public treasuries.' In the
1960's and 1970's, as Supreme Court decisions expanded the class-
es of cases to which the right to counsel applied' and continued
to define the point in an investigation at which a suspect became
entitled to an attorney,' 2 the fiscal burden of complying with con-
19 See supra Parts II and IlI.
,91 See Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53-54 (upholding Oregon recoupment statute and broadly
endorsing concept in general); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1972) (invalidat-
ing Kansas recoupment statute which denied indigent defendants many of the exemptions
available to other civil judgment debtors but broadly approving variety of legitimate
interests served by recoupment in general); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966)
(invalidating New Jersey reimbursement provision applicable only to incarcerated defen-
dants but stating "[w]e may assume that a legislature could validly provide for replenish-
ing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly benefited from coun-
ty expenditures.'); see also State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 124 (Alaska 1995) (Bryner, J.
pro tempore, dissenting) ("A recoupment plan's only legitimate purpose lies in reimburs-
ing the state for actual costs incurred for legal services . . . '). At least one's state's
statutory recoupment provisions have been said to serve rehabilitative purposes. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-57.1 (1997); Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 122, 125 (4th Cir.
1984).
19' See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches upon initiation of adversary judicial proceedings); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent defendant entitled to counsel on first appeal as of right);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to state criminal prosecutions).
192 See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (remanded to determine wheth-
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stitutional mandates increased substantially.'93 More recently, sta-
tistics reveal that approximately seventy-five to eighty percent of
criminal defendants are indigent.9 4  Therefore, they may be enti-
tled to appointed counsel, indicating that indigent legal defense
costs continue to be a significant element of state budgets.' The
states, of course, maintain a substantial interest in recovering a
portion of the funds thus expended.'96 Yet, regardless of the de-
gree of importance attributed to the government's interest in cost-
recovery, because recognition of an indigent accused's choice in
the selection of his counsel neither advances nor inhibits this inter-
est, it has no place in an analysis of whether and to what extent an
indigent defendant should be afforded some voice in the selection
of his appointed counsel. 97
er the denial of the right to counsel in preliminary hearing stage of criminal prosecution
constitutes harmless error); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel ex-
tended to felony defendants' probation revocation proceeding where deferred sentencing
to be imposed); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel extended
to post-indictment lineups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (suspect in custody
and subject to police interrogation entitled to counsel).
" See James, 407 U.S. at 141 (recognizing that expansion of right to counsel has
"heightened the burden on public revenues).
'94 Pamela S. Karlan, Symposium, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
583 n.3 (1995).
'1s In New York, New York City alone annually contributes approximately $60 mil-
lion to the Legal Aid Society, the primary organization providing indigent criminal de-
fense representation. Matthew Goldstein, Private Defenders Could Outearn Legal Aid,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 1997, at 1. In addition, the City could spend an additional $63.8
million in fiscal year 1997 on non-Legal Aid indigent criminal defense services. Id.
Comparatively, the Georgia General Assembly approved a fiscal year 1998 indigent
defense budget in the amount of $4.28 million. Lolita Browning, 43% Hike for Indigent
Defense; $1.2 Million to Add Death-Case Lawyer, Aid Counties, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REPORT, April 4, 1997.
" Cf. James, 407 U.S. at 141 (stating that "state interests represented by recoupment
law may prove important ones . . ").
197 As noted supra note 10, this Article assumes, without discussing, the validity of
the primary thrust of recoupment statutes-repayment to the government of all or some
portion of legal defense costs. Given this posture of the issue, an indigent criminal
defendant who is otherwise covered by the jurisdiction's applicable reimbursement stat-
ute will be required to meet his reimbursement obligation whether he has had a voice
in the selection of his appointed counsel or not. Thus, the government's interest in
recouping costs associated with indigent criminal defense, however compelling it may
be, is simply not implicated by the accused's selection of his appointed attorney. Th-
erefore, it is irrelevant to a consideration of whether such a right of choice should be
recognized.
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V. RETHINKING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Recognizing a Right of Choice
The significance of recoupment statutes to the indigent
defendant's asserted right to choose his counsel lies solely in their
tendency to advance the indigent's standing to assert his preference
by imposing statutory financial obligations which more closely align
him with his non-indigent counterpart who unquestionably retains a
Sixth Amendment interest in counsel of choice.'98 Viewed in this
light, the operation of recoupment statutes bolsters the indigent's
claim to a right of choice while adding nothing to the governmental
interests which have traditionally been asserted against recognition
of such a right.199
It may, however, be argued that recoupment statutes only en-
hance the claims of right of those defendants who, while indigent at
the time of counsel's appointment, later discharge their statutory
obligation by actually repaying the costs associated with their legal
defense. According to this view, only those defendants who actually
repay such costs should have a voice in the selection of their attor-
ney. Since repayment will likely occur, if at all, at some point after
counsel has been appointed, and more likely after an adjudication
of guilt or innocence," ° courts will have no way of knowing at
the time when the right to choice would be exercised whether the
defendant will have satisfied the repayment condition precedent,
triggering the existence of the right.
While the above argument is not without plausibility, the gra-
vamen of its reasoning is its assumption that repayment alone is the
sole factor supporting the indigent's constitutional claim to a right to
counsel of choice. The indigent criminal defendant's Sixth Amend
'9 See supra Part II (discussing constitutional right to counsel of choice for non-indi-
gent).
19 See generally supra Part III.B (critically discussing asserted government interests in
denying right to choice of counsel to indigents).
I See Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that 'any re-
payment by a formerly indigent defendant . . . normally occurs well after the [legal]
services are performed."); People v. Cozad, 511 N.E.2d 211, 216-17 (111. App. Ct. 1987)
(commenting that trial court erred in assessing attorney fees for purposes of reimburse-
ment prior to services having been rendered).
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ment interests in choosing his own counsel are compelling even
absent consideration of the repayment obligations imposed by re-
coupment statutes and warrant recognition.2"'
Moreover, even if it were impossible to determine with preci-
sion at the time counsel is appointed whether a particular defendant
would subsequently develop the financial ability to discharge his
repayment obligations, this imprecision only alerts us to the unre-
markable fact that any system which considers repayment as a factor
relevant to the right to choose an attorney will be incapable of
maintaining a mathematically precise correspondence between
instances of actual repayment and extensions of the right to choice.
Indeed, constitutional law has never required such synergy. In the
speedy trial context, for example, a right unquestionably guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment,2 2 it has never been held that all of the
constitutionally significant interests underlying the right must be
implicated in an individual case, if each particular criminal defen-
dant is to be guaranteed the right to a speedy trial." 3 Repayment
is simply another factor militating in favor of recognizing the con-
stitutional nature of the indigent accused's interest in selecting his
own counsel. The mere fact that in any particular case, this factor is
not implicated by the facts of the case no more requires the con-
clusion that the "right" does not exist than does the absence of a
201 See supra Parts II and Ill.
202 The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ' U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The right has been extended to state criminal prosecutions through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
222-23 (1967).
203 The right to a speedy trial is premised upon an accused's interest in (i) avoiding
prolonged detention prior to trial, (ii) avoiding the intense anxiety and public suspicion
attendant to pending criminal charges, and (iii) litigating the issue of guilt or innocence
before evidence disappears and with it the ability to defend oneself. See United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966). Any one of these interests is sufficient to trigger the speedy trial right. See, e.g.,
Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 214, 218-22 (prosecutor's "nolle prosequi with leave' following trial
which ended in hung jury and pursuant to which prosecutor could reinstate charges
without further court order implicated defendant's interest in avoiding anxiety and public
suspicion attendant to pending charges and thus violated speedy trial right). Likewise,
the mere fact that one of the interests is not implicated on the facts of the case does
not preclude applicability of the speedy trial right. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30, 36-38 (1970) (prosecution dismissed on speedy trial grounds where, in seven years
following armed robbery charge during which defendant was not imprisoned but possible
defense witnesses either died or could no longer be located, defendant had not been
brought to trial despite speedy trial requests).
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particular defendant's pre-trial confinement, for example, in the
speedy trial context require the conclusion that that right should not
exist.2° The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the right to
counsel of choice should be recognized, despite the potential to
overinclusively benefit some defendants who will eventually de-
fault, or denied, despite the potential to underinclusively detriment
some defendants who will eventually repay.05
Ultimately, in light of the individual and systemic values under-
lying the Sixth Amendment's vindication of personal choice, which
apply irrespective of repayment,206  the recoupment obligations
uniformly imposed on indigent criminal defendants, and the inade-
quacy of the governmental interests traditionally asserted against the
indigent's right of choice, a system which occasionally extends a
choice of counsel to defendants who do not repay must be pre-
ferred over one which uniformly denies a choice to those who
do.207 The Sixth Amendment should be interpreted to recognize
"I If the answer is that the speedy trial right is textually explicit in the Sixth Amend-
ment and that the indigent accused's 'right' to counsel of choice is not, the real chal-
lenge is then revealed not as one concerned with the relevance of reimbursement sup-
porting recognition of the claimed "right,' but rather one which is concerned with
whether the claimed 'right' is textually supported by the Sixth Amendment. Yet, if this
is the basis for rejecting the claimed 'right,' it likewise provides the basis for rejecting
the well-settled right of the non-indigent to counsel of choice. Neither right is explicitly
found in the text of the Amendment. See supra note 19. The right of the non-indigent
to retain counsel of choice, however, is not seriously questioned. See case cited supra
note 26.
1 As noted, the issue immediately sub judice is whether a constitutional right, in
some necessarily limited form, and as an aspect of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, should be recognized in favor of indigent criminal defendants to choose which
attorney is appointed to represent them. Assuming such a right is recognized, whether in
any particular case, it has been violated-a, question which indeed might consider the
constitutional interests implicated in the individual case in the context of any contrary
societal or governmental interests also at stake-is the subject of the discussion infra Part
V.C. Current law, by refusing to recognize such a right, even in limited form, resembles
the "underinclusive" paradigm.
20' See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A (discussing
values underlying Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of choice).
2" Because, as noted, the right to choice in the selection of one's counsel serves the
systemic interest in maintaining a healthy adversarial system and contributes to a greater
quality of legal representation, see supra Part II.A, supra note 132 and accompanying
text, this right, like other Sixth Amendment rights, implicates interests beyond individual
defendants and particular cases. The right to a speedy trial, for example, has been held
to implicate various 'societal interests.' Prompt disposition (i) furthers society's interest in
promoting rehabilitative concerns, which might otherwise be eroded by lengthy delays
between arrest and punishment, (ii) limits society's exposure to potentially dangerous
defendants on bail who may commit additional crimes before trial on pending charges,
and (iii) decreases the opportunities for defendants to flee the jurisdiction before a trial
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the indigent criminal defendant's interest in being represented by an
attorney of his choosing.
B. Methodological Framework for Analyzing Right to Choice
Claims
Because of the well-settled state of the law that indigent crimi-
nal defendants do not enjoy a right to counsel of their choosing and
the tendency of courts to mechanically reject the relatively few
challenges which are made to that principle," 8 judicial discussion
of how that question should be approached (as opposed to how it
should be resolved) has been sparse. In light of the emergence of
"balancing" as perhaps the primary method for adjudicating consti-
tutional claims and its role in the case law addressing limitations on
the right to retain counsel of choice," 9 this Article adopts the
"balancing" methodology as the analytical framework within which
to decide the breadth of the right which has been advanced.210
Considering the demonstrated ability of trial courts to accommodate
the right of non-indigent defendants to choose their own coun-
sel,2" ' the proposed approach borrows from both the substantive
and procedural law which has developed in that area. In doing so,
is conducted. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-21 (1972). Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment right to 'conflict-free representation' also implicates societal and systemic
concerns which transcend individual defendants in particular cases. See generally supra
Part I.B.2. Given the broad implications of the right to counsel of choice, it is appropri-
ate, therefore, when considering the breadth of its application, to consider interests
which extend beyond any individual defendant or particular case. Certainly, if societal
and institutional concerns may limit constitutional interests, as the discussion in supra
Part ll.B illustrates, they may also justify extending constitutional interests as Barker
demonstrates.
= See supra notes 102 and 119 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A. But see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
210 This approach is undertaken with full cognizance of the criticisms which have
been leveled against 'balancing' in constitutional adjudication. See supra note 116. See
generally Aleinikoff, supra note 50; Strossen, supra note 50, at 1184-1207 (identifying
general problems with "balancing' and identifying specific problems in Fourth Amend-
ment context); Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resur-
recting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
531, 554-562 (1997) (arguing that Fourth Amendment balancing dilutes the protection
that the Amendment was intended to provide). The approach is adopted here as a re-
flection of the unlikely prospect that courts will break from the "balancing' trend.
211 See generally supra Part II.
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this approach reaps the benefit of the experience which has given
rise to that substantial body of case law, while providing a measure
of predictability to a developing parallel jurisprudence.
In passing on an indigent's request for particular counsel, exer-
cise of the trial court's discretion should reflect a delicate balance
between the defendant's right to adequate representation by counsel
of his choice and the interest in prompt, ethical and efficient admin-
istration of justice.212 Because the indigent's choice is of constitu-
tional dimension, there should be a presumption in favor of accom-
modating the defendant's preference.213 A defendant should not
presume, however, that his right to counsel of choice includes the
right to unduly frustrate the effective administration of the court's
calendar.214 Thus, a defendant's unreasonable delay in selecting
an attorney, or requests for substitution once counsel has been
appointed, would be afforded no presumption of legitimacy.25 A
trial court would have broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate
response to abusive or dilatory tactics. 216 The right to counsel of
1I This formulation of the balancing test resembles the approach taken in the non-
indigent context and incorporates the more recent admonition of Wheat v. United States
that federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure the criminal proceedings
.are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession .... 486 U.S. 153, 160
(1988); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
213 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164 (recognizing presumption in favor of non-indigent's
choice of attomey). A defendant would not have to justify his initial choice of a partic-
ular attomey. If the government should seek to disqualify a defendant's choice, it would
bear the burden of demonstrating the necessity of granting the requested relief. This
evidentiary framework reflects current law in the non-indigent context. See United States
v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d
1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). Following the initial appointment of defendant's chosen
counsel, however, the defendant would bear the burden of justifying a subsequent re-
quest for substitution.
214 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 213.
216 See supra notes 56 and 62 and accompanying text. Where the right to self-repre-
sentation is concemed, the Supreme Court has recognized its prominent place within the
Sixth Amendment, but nonetheless said that "the trial judge may terminate self-represen-
tation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist miscon-
duct. . . . The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom.' Faretta v. Califomia, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975); see also Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that a defendant may lose his right to be present
in the courtroom during his trial by disruptive and obstreperous conduct and stating that
a trial judge has discretion sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case). There fails
to exist anything to suggest that a different approach should not apply in the right to
chosen counsel context. Indeed, recognition of the right to choice within these parame-
ters would be directly responsive to one of the primary concerns raised by the courts
which have traditionally refused the right to counsel of choice for the indigent. See gen-
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choice should not be used as a weapon against the legitimate inter-
est in avoiding unnecessary delay.217
C. Guidelines and Operation of Methodological Framework
Because balancing approaches, by their nature, require courts
to decide cases on an individual basis, each of the facts and cir-
cumstances which may be considered in passing on requests for
particular attorneys cannot reasonably be foreseen. Yet, while it is
impossible to parse in advance all of the factors which a trial court
should consider,21 some considerations are readily apparent from
the few decisions which have articulated rationales for denying
recognition of an indigent's right to chosen counsel-(1) the trial
court's need for efficiency, and (2) the reasons for the defendant's
choice.19 In addition to these relevant considerations, the pro-
posed approach incorporates the limitations developed in the non-
indigent choice-of-counsel cases pertaining to lay representation,
disbarred former attorneys and conflicts of interest.22 °
erally supra Part III.B.2.b.
217 See Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978) (cautioning that the
right to select attorney is not to be used "as a manipulative monkey wrench.'); see also
cases cited supra note 60. Trial courts are under tremendous pressure to keep burgeon-
ing criminal dockets moving. See The Speedy Trial Act § 208, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
(1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (authorizing district courts to dismiss indictment for "un-
necessary delay" in presenting charges to grand jury or bringing a defendant to trial);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b) (requiring district courts to conduct a continuing study of criminal
justice administration and to prepare plans for the prompt disposition of criminal cases).
However, the courts do not maintain a monopoly over the concerns raised by pre-trial
delay. Such delay may frequently benefit a defendant, as the threat of fading memories
and disappearing evidence erodes the government's ability to prove its case. The defen-
dant's interests in minimizing pre-trial detention, avoiding the anxiety of rising public
suspicion due to the pending criminal charges, and marshalling defense evidence over
time indicate that many defendants share courts' concern for avoiding unnecessary pre-
trial delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (recognizing that "[i]nordinate delay between arrest, indict-
ment, and trial may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense."); United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (articulating similar concern).
218 See supra note 151.
219 See supra III.B.1-3.
2" See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; supra Part ll.B.2.
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1. Administrative Concerns
The most significant limitation on the indigent's choice of
counsel would require the defendant to make his selection from
among the panel of available attorneys rendering public defender
assistance in the jurisdiction.22' Thus, indigent defendants would
not be at liberty to "pick and choose" among members of the local
bar.22 In order properly to assess the likely effect of the indigent's
choice on the administration of the court's calendar, courts should
consider the general availability of the selected attorney, including
both his current case load and, where reasonably possible, the
attorney's own assessment of whether he can provide representation
without undue delay or excessive requests for continuances.2 3
Absent a clear demonstration that the defendant's choice will occa-
sion substantial delay, that choice may not be denied on the ground
of either "administrative efficiency" or "overburdening" a particular
attorney.2 4 Because this analysis must necessarily be conducted
on the basis of probabilities and the good faith assessments of both
attorneys and trial judges, however, courts should be afforded wide
discretion in making these determinations. 22' A court's refusal to
21 This limitation recognizes the practical and legal reality that attorneys in private
practice are not likely to be compelled to render legal assistance to a person who, by
definition, is too poor to pay for the services. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII (prohibiting
involuntary servitude). But see Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, A Lonely Crusade Against El
Paso's Mandatory Pro Bono Plan, TEXAS LAWYER, April 7, 1997, at 28 (describing unique
mandatory pro bono criminal appointment system in Texas which requires attorneys
either to accept appointments or pay $600 to be excused).
m See United States v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
indigent defendants "cannot pick and choose among members of the district court's
bar').
I By considering the impact of a defendant's choice on selected attorneys' case-
loads, the proposed paradigm not only recognizes trial courts' administrative concerns
but also directly responds to the argument that indigent defendant's should not be per-
mitted to overburden particularly 'popular' attorneys. See cases cited supra notes 125-
28.22 Each of these concerns has been raised as a reason for refusing even to recognize
the indigent's right of choice. See supra Part IlI.B.2. In light of this Article's conclusion
that such a right should be recognized, the proposed approach more appropriately postu-
lates these legitimate concerns as factors to be considered in individual cases. In each
case these factors' relevance should be raised rather than presumed in all cases. See
supra note 146 (criticizing unnecessary resort to overly broad presumptions to resolve
legal issues).
225 Recognition of the trial court's broad discretion in this regard is not intended to
dilute the proposed approach's requirement that any undue delay be substantial and
clearly shown as a condition precedent to denying the indigent's choice. See supra text
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appoint a defendant's first choice of counsel on either of these
basis, should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.226
2. Reasons for Choice
The second readily apparent factor which trial courts should
examine in passing on an indigent's choice of particular counsel is
any reason proffered by a defendant in support of his personal
selection. While this factor may seem to be an inappropriate con-
sideration under circumstances in which the defendant is exercising
a constitutionally protected right,227 it would not only preserve the
defendant's right to be heard but his reasons may be helpful or
persuasive to the court. Regardless of how "unwise" his explanation
may seem, however, absent an independent basis for declining the
appointment of chosen counsel, the defendant's choice should be
given effect.228 fact, a trial court should not sua sponte request
that a defendant state any reason at all for his initial selection. Any
reasons considered must be tendered voluntarily by an unprompted
defendant.229
The trial court's responsibility in this regard is a delicate one. In
entertaining a defendant's proffer, a high degree of respect must be
given to the accused's free choice. Because personal choice is the
essence of the right,23  its exercise defies application of any litmus
paper test. Thus, courts must be careful to avoid substituting their
judgment for that of the defendant.23" '
accompanying note 225.
226 Under current law, in light of trial courts' traditionally broad power to govern the
conduct of cases before them, the abuse of discretion standard predominates appellate
review of counsel of choice cases. See supra notes 56, 62 and 81 and accompanying
text.
... See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (admonishing
that a court should not inquire into a defendant's reasons for his choice of counsel);
Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 893-95 (5th Cir. 1977) (indicating that, in
right to self-representation context, the court may not pass on the validity of a
defendant's reasons for wanting to proceed pro se).
228 In the absence of stated reasons for his choice, the presumption in favor of ap-
pointing chosen counsel should speak for the defendant.
2 See Burton, 584 F.2d at 491.
230 See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (recognizing that the
right to counsel of choice reflects constitutional protection of a defendant's free choice
apart from its tendency to promote the adversarial system); see also supra notes 96-99
and accompanying text.
232 Cf. Chapman, 553 F.2d at 893-95 (indicating that court should not judge the
validity of a defendant's reasons for invoking his right to self-representation).
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Furthermore, though they may not be articulated in terms as
eloquent as their effect may be profound, certain reasons should
resonate with the trial court.232 Thus, special consideration should
be given if chosen counsel was selected because of a prior relation-
ship or other developed rapport with the defendant exists which
will contribute measurably to the quality of the representation.233
Heightened deference to the indigent's choice in such circumstanc-
es reflects the reality that lawyers are neither a "homogeneous
group" nor "fungible" and that a defendant's selection of an attor-
ney whom he knows may not only contribute to the preservation of
the adversary system, but also form a part of his trial strategy.
234
Under such circumstances, the defendant's reasons should be ac-
corded the highest deference.
23 See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
z The Supreme Court has recognized that counsel's performance is so intimately
linked to the compelling interest in preservation of the adversarial system that a
defendant's choice of counsel may be compromised in circumstances where his
attorney's effectiveness may be diminished. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
158-60 (1988). See generally supra Part ll.B.2. Thus, where counsel's performance may
be enhanced because of a prior relationship or other established rapport with a defen-
dant, the resultant incremental benefit to the adversarial system justifies special consider-
ation of the defendant's choice.
I See United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3rd Cir. 1979) (recognizing impor-
tance of choice of particular attorney in light of defendant's right to direct his defense).
"' Indigent criminal defendants' mistrust and lack of confidence in appointed attor-
neys (usually public defenders) is well documented. See Jones v. Bames, 463 U.S. 745,
761 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the law-
yers appointed to represent them.'); Berger, supra note 171, at 53-54; Albert W.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1241-42
(1975). This mistrust can have a corrosive effect on counsel's ability to render effective
assistance and may thereby weaken the adversarial system. See supra Part II.A. An
indigent's request for appointed counsel with whom he has a prior relationship, there-
fore, deserves heightened consideration, if only to promote effective advocacy. In fact,
defendants' requests frequently reflect this rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Ely, 719
F.2d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1983) (requesting appointment of other attorney who was pres-
ent in the courtroom, defendant explained "[the other attorney] had represented business
of mine at one time and I have - I feel a more closer relationship with [him] in un-
derstanding what is before me. . .'); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1008
(Cal. 1973) (defendant explaining 'I know Attorney Hodge, and I have consulted with
him concerning this case; I respect the competence and ability of Attorney Hodge and
have confidence in him as my attorney; because of the foregoing, I will cooperate with
Attorney Hodge. . . . I do not want Attorney Breiner to represent me since I do not
know him; I do not have the confidence in him as is vital in a capital case . . .).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Jackson once observed that "the mere fact that a
path is a beaten one is a persuasive reason for following it."236
Denial of the indigent criminal defendant's choice in the selection
of counsel is indeed a well-worn path. Yet the danger in continuing
to navigate a familiar road lies in the tendency to hinder the search
for better ways to the destination and to instill a reluctance to en-
tertain suggested alternatives.
This Article has discussed the constitutional interests which
underlie the right to counsel of choice and explained how those
interests apply irrespective of a criminal defendant's financial condi-
tion. The rationales which have traditionally, if only infrequently,
been cited as justification for denying the right to indigents are
either outmoded or illusory. Judicial experience with, and the law
which has developed in the context of, the right of non-indigents to
retain counsel of choice requires rethinking the Sixth Amendment
for the indigent accused. In addition, the repayment obligations
imposed by recoupment statutes only further the indigent's standing
to assert his preference of attorney. By requiring indigent defen-
dants, who obtain the financial means to do so, to repay all or a
portion of the costs of their criminal defense, while simultaneously
denying to the accused any choice in the selection of his attorney,
current law unjustifiably requires the indigent to pay the piper with-
out extending any real authority to call the tune. The proposed
approach provides a starting point for recognizing and administering
the indigent accused's right to counsel of choice and thus extends
to the indigent a limited playlist in exchange for his obligation to
pay for the selection.
2"6 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1, 26 (1945).
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